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DAUBERT'S BACKWASH: LITIGATION-GENERATED SCIENCE
William L. Anderson*
Barry M. Parsons**
Dr. Drummond Rennie***
In the 1993 landmark case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the
United States Supreme Court articulated its position on the admissibility of scientific
evidence. The Court reasoned that federal judges should rely on the processes scien-
tists use to identify unreliable research, including the process of peer review, to
determine when scientific evidence should be inadmissible. In response, lawyers and
their clients, seeking to rely on such evidence, have begun funding and publishing
their own research with the primary intention of providing support to cases they are
litigating. This Article examines the phenomenon of litigation-generated science, how
it potentially undermines the Daubert review process, and how such evidence
should be handled by the scientific community and by courts under Daubert.
Through the familiar concepts of peer review and general acceptance,
as expressed in Frye' and Dauberd jurisprudence, our legal system
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M.BA. 1990, American University;J.D. 1995, George Mason University School of Law.
*** Western Editor, Journal of the American Medical Association. B.A. 1957, Cambridge Uni-
versity; M.B., B.Chir. 1960, Guy's Hospital Medical School; M.D., M.A. 1969, Cambridge
University; elected 1977, Fellow of Royal College of Physicians. Dr. Rennie is a leading figure in
the subjects of medical journal peer review and conflicts of interest in medical research. He was
one of the original organizers of the International Congress on Peer Review in Biomedical
Research and has written extensively on peer review and the need for conflicts disclosure. Dr.
Rennie assisted the other authors as an expert in a recent case involving the publication by a
plaintiffs' expert of two litigation-funded studies in an ostensibly peer-reviewed journal without
disclosure of the source of funding or litigation connection of the research.
In keeping with the spirit of this Article, the attorney authors acknowledge that we practice
in products liability and toxic tort litigation and frequently represent defendants in lawsuits
alleging health effects and other injuries and exposure to chemical products. We fully expect
and hope that the principles and proposed approaches discussed in this Article would be ap-
plied even-handedly to all parties in science-based litigation.
1. Frye v. United States, 293 E 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Almost eighty years ago, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit Court, in a remarkably short and simple opinion, established in Frye
the now-familiar standard of "general acceptance" as the test for determining the admissibility
of novel scientific evidence. Id. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 585-86
(1993). The test has been widely used, even after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, to determine whether scientific testimony would be permitted in federal, and many
state, courts. See ERIC D. GREEN AND CHARLES R. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS
ON EVIDENCE 649 (1983).
2. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In Daubert, the Supreme
Court, addressing the growing dissatisfaction with the Frye test, determined that Frye's "general
acceptance" standard had been superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Id. at 587. Daubert's multi-factor and two-prong test of reliability and fit (discussed in detail
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relies heavily on the activities of scientists to help keep meritless
scientific ideas and methodologies out of the courtroom. Given
sufficient time and resources, the processes scientists use to iden-
tify unreliable research work reasonably well. Improperly
performed or fraudulent studies may have a moment in the sun,
but they ordinarily cannot survive the intense scientific scrutiny
that follows. Recognizing this, the Supreme Court in Daubert ex-
plicidy encouraged federal court litigants to rely on the scientific
community, initially and primarily, to protect the courts from unre-
liable, novel3 science.
But what if the novel science under review is actually not the
work of independent researchers, but of lawyers intent on creating
evidence to survive a Daubert review? Since its issuance in 1993,
Daubert has escalated the rejection of expert testimony which relies
on unaccepted scientific methodologies4 to support novel litigation
opinions. 5 Those experts' opinions often have little or no support
in the scientific literature and are instead derived from anecdotal
evidence, claims of injury, alleged "clusters," or strained reinter-
pretations of existing research.6 Lawyers who seek to support novel
litigation theories are discovering that unless they have original,
peer-reviewed, published literature supporting their theories, a
Daubert hearing may be the end of their case. Plaintiffs' law firms
and their consortiums, specializing in novel toxic tort lawsuits and
funded by massive settlements in asbestos, tobacco, and other liti-
gation, can now fund the scientific research needed for their cases
and arrange for publication of that research in one of the thou-
sands of scientific and medical journals in the U.S. and elsewhere.
in Section IIIA) is now the law in all federal courts and has been adopted by many state
courts. See Connecticut v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57, 698 A.2d 739 (1997) (surveying state court
adoption of Daubert standard).
3. The word novel is used to refer to litigation theories based on scientific causation
arguments that have not received previous serious attention or review by the scientific
community. See, e.g., Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co., 921 F Supp. 666, 674 (D. Nev.
1996) ("The assertions of plaintiffs' experts that exposure to chlorine damages the brain
and nervous system are novel, and, as noted above, unsupported by scientific research ex-
traneous to this litigation.").
4. Peter Huber apparently coined the term "junk science" in 1991 to refer to such
evidence. See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE:JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 209
(1991). The term has come to represent the realm of opinion and conjecture often used to
support litigation, but having no basis or support in legitimate scientific methodology. See
Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 153 (1997) ("[T]his is not the sort of 'junk science' with
which Daubert was concerned.").
5. See Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using
Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335 (1999)
(arguing that the threshold for admissibility of scientific expertise has risen significantly as a
result of Daubert).
6. See infra Sections III & IV.
[VOL. 34:4
Daubert's Backwash
Original research on the plaintiffs' side, in turn, may drive defen-
dants to respond with litigation-focused research of their own.
Both the courts and the medical/scientific professions are thus
likely to face, and in fact are already facing,7 a growing and poten-
tially troubling phenomenon-the creation of a body of scientific
studies generated for and funded by litigation. To be sure, litiga-
tion science" is not inherently bad science. In fact, the entities that
bring and defend toxic tort-related lawsuits may someday provide a
source of funding for important public health research. Nonethe-
less, the reliability and accuracy of litigation-based research is likely
to be viewed with suspicion because of the potential bias arising
from the source of funding for the research and the relationship
between the researchers and the lawyers. Pressures resulting from
the need to obtain the "right" outcome may result in manipulated
procedures, distorted data, selective reporting of results, or even
falsified outcomes.
Unless it is recognized as a special problem, litigation science
threatens to upset the notions upon which Daubert is built. By rely-
ing on the processes of peer review,9 publication, and "general
acceptance" in the scientific community, the Daubert Court placed
its trust in large part on the objectivity and thoroughness of scien-
tists as the vehicle for preventing improper methodologies from
entering the scientific realm, and thereby the legal realm. The
Court's reliance is based on the concept of the scientific and medi-
cal communities as principled, independent seekers of factual
reality, largely unaffected by the blatant advocacy on which our liti-
gation process is based. To the extent this concept is accurate to
begin with, 10 it begins to fall apart if lawyers and litigation experts
invade the realm of scientific research and manipulate the medical
and scientific publication system to achieve their litigation ends. Is
the scientific journal community equipped to detect and reject bi-
ased and invalid litigation-based studies? Is the broader scientific
community capable of recognizing the potential flaws in such studies
and, if necessary, refusing to accord them "general acceptance?"
7. See infta Section I.
8. The phrase "litigation science" (or "litigation-generated science"), as used in this
Article, refers to studies conducted for expected use in litigation. In many instances, the
research will have been funded by lawyers or litigants and/or controlled in some manner by
the lawyers or their testifying experts.
9. Unless otherwise noted, our use of the phrase "peer review" is akin to what is also
known as "journal peer review." Journal peer review is distinguished from other forms of
peer review that are typically referred to as regulatory peer review or funding peer review.
10. As discussed in Section II.B.4, infra, even researchers performing scientific studies
unrelated to any litigation face pressures that can affect the validity of test results and re-
porting.
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Will any scientists even be interested enough to respond to an ob-
scure publication that might support admissibility under Daubert?
If the answer to these questions is no, then courts must find a way
to perform the screening that would ordinarily be the province of
the scientific world.
In this Article, we analyze the peculiar risks involved in litiga-
tion-generated science and propose that both scientists and courts
must develop a more rigorous frame of reference for identifying
litigation science in the first instance and determining whether
such science is reliable. Part I of this Article offers some examples
of litigation science in recent cases to give the reader perspective
on how litigants are creating scientific research and using journal
publication to pass Daubert muster. Part II then provides back-
ground on the falsification process11 by which the scientific
community evaluates the reliability of its own science and on which
Daubert would have courts rely. We offer a brief primer on publica-
tion peer review, a key part of that process, because publication is
likely the doorway through which lawyers will attempt to legitimize
litigation science. Part III briefly reviews some of the approaches
courts have taken under Daubert's peer review requirement and
how courts have handled litigation science to date. Part IV analyzes
the peculiar risks of litigation-generated science and suggests a
methodology for both scientists and the court system to examine
litigation-generated studies, focusing in particular on the impor-
tance of disclosure of the litigation connection and obtaining
independent verification of the research. To provide structure to
portions of that methodology and to give courts and litigants an
unbiased resource for validating litigation-based studies, it may be
necessary to either utilize an existing source of independent ex-
perts, such as Duke University's Registry, 2 or to create a special
institute for litigation research.
Litigation-driven science may ultimately provide a useful contri-
bution to the scientific literature, but not until there are processes
in place to ensure its scientific reliability. The scientific and legal
communities need to recognize the peculiar risks posed by litiga-
tion science, ensure disclosure of its source, and require thorough
11. The "falsification process" is the methodology by which scientists reduce hypothe-
ses to more reliable conclusions. See infra notes 77-102 and accompanying text.
12. The Registry is a list of independent scientific and technical experts who are will-
ing to advise courts in the resolution of cases involving scientific and technical issues.
Private Adjudication Center, About the Registry, in THE REGISTRY OF INDEPENDENT SCIENTIFIC
AND ThCHNICAL ADvisoRs, available at http://www.law.duke.edu/pac/registry/about.html
(last visited Nov. 3, 2001).
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peer review and independent guarantees of its reliability before
letting it into either the scientific realm or the courtroom.
I. THE GROWING USE OF LITIGATION SCIENCE
The use of litigation science in courts is not a mere theoretical
concern. While not yet a tidal wave, examples of studies performed
by testifying experts for use in litigation, often accompanied by
publication in supposedly peer-reviewed journals, appear in a
number of recent published opinions. It is likely that other in-
stances exist but have not found their way into the published
literature of court opinions. As background, we briefly provide de-
scriptions of published examples here. Section III discusses the
courts' handling of these proffered tests in more detail.
Ruffin v. Shaw Industries, Inc.l3 : Plaintiffs alleging toxic injury
from carpet emissions retained an expert, Dr. Anderson, to per-
form testing on a carpet sample in an air chamber and claimed to
have achieved toxic effects on mice as a result. She did not publish
her findings. Dr. Anderson's testing prompted not only a Congres-
sional hearing, 14 but also attempts to replicate the result by the
United States Environmental Protection Agency, a University of
Pittsburgh researcher, and two carpet manufacturers, Dow Chemi-
cal Company and Monsanto Company.15 None of the attempted
replications obtained any relevant toxic effects, much less the fatal
effects achieved by Dr. Anderson. 6
Black v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc.": Plaintiffs' expert psychologist, Dr.
Scotti, performed a form of an epidemiological study to demon-
strate the effects of fire and release of toluene from a plant in West
Virginia on persons living near the plant. He presented his find-
ings at two symposia, but did not reveal the litigation connection
of his study at those symposia and did not otherwise publish the
study." Dr. Scotti's firm, Survey Associates, was formed as a result of
work for the plaintiffs' law firm and had never done any work
13. 149 E3d 294, 297-98 (4th Cir. 1998).
14. See Potential Health Risks from Carpets and Carpeting Material: Hearing Before the House
Subcomm. on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources, 103d Cong. 1 (1993) (opening
statement of Rep. Synar, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Environment, Energy, and Natural
Resources).
15. 149 F3d at 297-98.
16. Id.
17. 19 F Supp. 2d 592, 594 (S.D. W. Va. 1998).
18. Id. at 600.
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other than for that law firm. 9 The law firm helped identify partici-
pants in the study; placed its phone number on flyers recruiting
participants; provided personnel to conduct study interviews; and
20
otherwise injected itself into the process of the study.
Bourne v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 21 : In a series of cases alleg-
ing birth defects from exposure to a fungicide, defended in part by
the attorney authors of this Article, plaintiffs' counsel, through its
chief testifying expert, commissioned a number of studies in re-
peated efforts to demonstrate in utero effects at levels
22
commensurate with the plaintiff mothers' exposures. The plain-
tiff's law firm funded a series of research projects, at considerable24
expense, to support the experts' assertions of human dermal ab-
sorption of the fungicide and their extrapolation of human
teratogenic effect levels from isolated cell in vitro studies.25 Plain-
tiffs' expert discussed two of the tests with the lead researcher (his
colleague at the same university), provided samples of the fungi-
cide, and assisted in the design and interpretation of the studies. 6
The authors of these studies submitted them for publication in the
19. Id. at 601.
20. Id. at 601-02.
21. No. 2:97-0090 (S.D. W. Va., filed Dec. 31, 1996). The Bourne case was one of four
filed in West Virginia alleging that exposures by mothers in England to a home garden
version of DuPont's fungicide Benlate caused the children to be born without eyes and with
various other conditions. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed three of the cases at the time their
experts reports were due. The fourth case, Bourne, proceeded through expert discovery.
The federal court recently ruled in Bourne that plaintiff's experts' causation testimony
should be excluded because their unsound methodologies did not satisfy Daubert's criteria
for reliability and relevance. See Memorandum Order, Bourne v. DuPont, Civ. Action No.
2:97-0090, filed Jan. 29, 2002 [hereinafter Bourne Opinion] (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
In a previous Florida case, Castillo v. DuPont, the plaintiff had obtained a jury verdict in
1996 using one of the same experts as in Bourne but that verdict was reversed on appeal on
Frye grounds based on the improper methodology used by the plaintiff's chief expert. 748
So. 2d 1108 (Fla. Ct. App. 2000), reh'ggranted, 2000 Fla. LEXIS 1812 (Aug. 31, 2000). As of
this publication, the Florida Supreme Court had not yet rendered its decision in the Castillo
matter.
22. Deposition of W.G. McLean, Slight v. E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co., at 19-26, 42-49
(Sept. 29, 1998) [hereinafter Dep. of W.G. McLean] (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform) (in vitro studies resulted from discussions with plaintiffs' expert and
were partly funded by plaintiffs's law firm); Deposition of Dr. Paul Sibbons, Bourne, at 31-35
(Oct. 22, 1999) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (describing
whole embryo rat studies commissioned by plaintiffs' expert); Court Order, Bourne (Oct. 12,
1999) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (granting extension for
plaintiffs to perform requested dermal absorption study).
23. See, e.g., Dep. of W.C. McLean, supra note 22, at 48-49.
24. One of these studies alone cost Plaintiffs firm over $200,000. See Letter from Ana
Rivero-Alexander to Honorable Judge John T. Copenhaver (March 3, 2000) (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
25. Bourne Opinion, supra note 21, at 4-19.
26. See Dep. of W.G. McLean, supra note 22, at 93-101.
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journal Neurotoxicology but the journal did not require any con-
flicts disclosure, and the authors did not inform the journal that
the studies were funded by a law firm and conducted on behalf of
a testifying expert.' 8 The other studies were not peer reviewed or
published.
Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali C0.2 19: In a litigation alleging neu-
rological damage from escaped chlorine, plaintiffs' expert Dr.
Kilburn conducted a variant of an epidemiological study of alleg-
edly exposed individuals to demonstrate causation. All of the
exposed participants in his study, however, were current plaintiffs
or were otherwise involved in the litigation.30 Dr. Kilburn pub-
lished his study in a journal, but the court noted that the journal
was not among the more than 3000 journals listed in the National
Library of Medicine's database or on the shelves of Johns Hopkins
School of Medicine.3 1
Nelson v. American Home Prods. Corp.32: Plaintiff retained several
experts that the court found to be highly qualified, but only two of
the experts formed their causation opinions before the case was
filed. 3 These opinions, however, were largely on anecdotal case
reports.34 A third expert, Dr. Hoyt, made similar causation diagno-
ses prior to the case before the court, but all three of his previous
diagnoses were in the context of litigation against the same defen-
dant.35 He also developed a new theory that had not been
published or tested.3 6 Another expert, Dr. Rhodes, published an
article addressing alleged causation while he was a paid expert in
another litigation.3' A fifth expert, Dr. Wurster, based his opinion
solely on materials received from plaintiff's lawyers-he did no in-
dependent research. 8
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Daubert IIJ9: In the
underlying Daubert case, plaintiffs' epidemiologists performed a
"reanalysis" of existing epidemiological studies to generate their
27. W.G. McLean et al., The Effect of Benomyl on Neurite Outgrowth in Mouse NB2A Human
SH-SY5YNeuroblastoma Cells in Vitro, 19 NEUROTOXICOLOGY 629 (1998).
28. See Dep. of W.G. McLean, supra note 22, at 127.
29. 921 E Supp. 666 (D. Nev. 1996).
30. Id. at 676.
31. Id. at 670 n.3.
32. 92 E Supp 2d 954 (W.D. Mo. 2000)
33. Id. at 968-69.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 959.
36. Id. at 959-60.
37. Id. at 958, 968.
38. Id. at 961, 968.
39. 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995) (on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court following
Daubert decision).
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opinion that Bendectin causes birth defects. The reanalysis con-
cluded, contrary to the finding of each of the underlying,
independently-performed studies, that Bendectin is a human tera-
404togen. The reanalysis was never published in a journal.41 One of
the plaintiffs' experts also apparently performed laboratory studies
of Bendectin but did not include enough information on the stud-
ies in his affidavit to make them an issue in the case.42
Worthington City Schools v. Abco Insulation 43: In this asbestos case,
defendants' expert utilized data collected from defendant compa-
nies in a number of litigations to publish an article showing that
the level of asbestos in the air in school buildings was no higher
than in ambient outside air.4 The study was published in a scien-
tific journal, Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology.45 Plaintiffs
attempted to have the article and testimony excluded because of
its litigation taint.
46
Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.4 : In a case alleging birth
defects from a fertility drug, plaintiffs' expert relied on an article
he had published several years before the instant litigation setting
forth his theory of causation.48 He apparently had not performed
any independent research but relied on his interpretation of exist-
ing animal studies. During a deposition, however, the expert
admitted that the article was not peer reviewed and was based on
research for a different litigation when he was already a "profes-
sional plaintiff's witness.
50
National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chemical Co.51: To support her
litigation opinion, plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Sherman, published two
articles in purportedly peer reviewed journals.52 The articles ad-
dressed "case reports" of alleged birth defects from exposure to a
Dow insecticide. 3 Dr. Sherman's role in the litigation was not re-
ported in the published articles, and her opinion in court
40. Id. at 1314.
41. Id. at 1318.
42. Id. at 1317 n.4.
43. 616 N.E.2d 550 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
44. Id. at 553.
45. Id. at 552-53.
46. Id. at 553.
47. 89 F.3d 594 (9th Cir. 1996).
48. Id. at 596.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 597.
51. 965 E Supp. 1490 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
52. Id. at 1499. The plaintiffs' expert had published articles in the International Journal
of Occupational Medicine & Toxicology and Archives Environmental Health Id.
53. Id. at 1498.
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extended beyond the conclusions expressed in the published arti-
cles.
54
These examples are likely not exhaustive, but they are enough
to illustrate that law firms and experts supporting novel litigation
theories are becoming increasingly willing to conduct and publish
their own studies to support those theories. All but two of the ex-
amples described occurred after the publication of the Supreme
Court's Daubert opinion.5 This is not a coincidence. Daubert has
placed a premium on verified, peer-reviewed research to support a
causation opinion, and some plaintiffs attorneys are advising their
colleagues to generate peer-reviewed testing and research to sup-
port their cases.56 If that research does not exist, litigants can now
be expected to create it.
II. ENSURING RELIABILITY IN THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY
To deal with litigation science under Daubert or otherwise, it is
imperative that the legal system understand how scientists would
address the potential unreliability of such research. To a large ex-
tent, the legal profession depends upon scientists, at least in the
first instance, to ferret out unreliable science, including unreliable
litigation science. The lawyer's critical eye can sometimes uncover
scientific fallacies and errors, but lawyer scrutiny is no substitute
for the far more knowledgeable evaluation by scientists possessing
the proper expertise. The methodologies by which scientists en-
sure reliability, however, are by no means foolproof. Courts and
litigants must initially have some understanding of those method-
ologies to ascertain the degree and exactitude of the scientific
review of a study or theory, and in particular to determine whether
claimed peer review is nothing more than a cover for an improp-
erly conducted study.
54. Id. at 1517.
55. Worthington and much of the research in Ruffin preceded Daubert.
56. Robert M.N. Palmer, Opening the Gates, TRIAL 86, 90 (June 2000) (recommending
that plaintiff experts conduct their own testing and "publish extensively in peer-reviewed
journals" to avoid a Daubert dismissal).
57. See Perry v. United States, 755 F2d 888, 892 (11 th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he examination
of a scientific study by a cadre of lawyers is not the same as its examination by others trained
in the field of science or medicine.").
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A. The Methodologies Used by Scientists to Ensure Validity
The approach taken by the Supreme Court in Daubert assumes
that the scientific community itself takes measures to ensure scien-
tific reliability and validity and that the legal system can rely in part
on those measures. Thus, when the Court identifies "peer review
and publication" as a "relevant, though not dispositive, considera-
tion in assessing the scientific validity" of a methodology, and
"general acceptance" as an "important factor,"5 the Court is im-
plicitly referencing the processes that scientists use to assess
themselves and their scientific products. The Court encourages
federal litigants to rely on those processes.
In some circumstances, the Court's reliance is reasonably well
placed. Certainly as to the bulk of scientific inquiry, in which re-
searchers incrementally add to or modify well-established
principles, there is little risk of error. Even in the case of new and
important theories that are on the cutting edge, given time and
enough reason to invest their energies and resources, scientists
and medical professionals can and do develop reasonably accurate
assessments of health risks and reject erroneous and baseless theo-
ries. This process, however, is often time-consuming, haphazard,
and cumbersome.5 9 There is no court of science to judge the valid-
ity of any given research. Instead, the verdict often arrives in pieces
and varying stages of uncertainty as further studies, criticisms, and
hypotheses come into play, until most (though rarely all) profes-
sionals feel sufficiently comfortable with the conclusions to lay the
issue to rest and move to the next crisis. As described by one scien-
tist-author,6° science is not built on stone as much as on pilings in a
swamp-the pilings are never driven to bedrock, but scientists quit
pounding when they feel the principle is secure enough to build
on.61 In the interim, a large number of published studies actually
58. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993).
59. In her book on the breast implant litigation, Dr. Marcia Angell of the New England
Journal of Medicine describes the resulting patchwork of studies on a given subject as a "mo-
saic of information that taken together yields the answer to a scientific question." MARCIA
ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL 109 (1996).
60. See KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE 138 (1997) (citing
KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 111 (1972)).
61. An excellent example is the story of prions. Several years ago, Dr. Stanley Prusiner
of the University of California San Francisco theorized that certain rare brain diseases
(scrapie in sheep, kuru in cannibals in New Guinea, mad cow disease in cattle, and others)
were caused by the genetic transmission of non-genetic, non-DNA material he termed pri-
ons. His theory attracted the attention, a good deal of it negative and even hostile, of some
of the top scientists in the world. It also provoked a wealth of new research, much of it un-
dertaken in an effort to disprove the theory, that ended up supporting it. Dr. Prusiner won
[VOL. 34:4
Daubert's Backwash
turn out to be wrong. Indeed, the scientific literature is full of
"peer-reviewed" but inaccurate articles and theories. 2 The falsifica-
tion process ultimately produces a reliable conclusion, but the
debris left behind is considerable and-in isolation-far from reli-
able.
Within this process, scientists have developed methods of reduc-
ing error and approximating reliability, i.e., driving the piling deep
enough. Chief among these methods, of course, is the scientific
method itself, the basic foundation for the validity of any scientific
63inquiry. A researcher using the scientific method must first set
forth a hypothesis, then design an experiment to test the hypothe-
sis, collect and analyze the results, and publish the results.64 It is
imperative that the test results can be replicated and verified by
others.6 The quality of any study will be determined in the first
instance by the extent to which it follows or deviates from the sci-
entific method.
Scientists have also developed external methods of ensuring that
unreliability is minimized. These methods taken together are
sometimes referred to as the broader version of "peer review,"66 to
be distinguished from the more limited form of publication peer
review performed by journals in accepting an article. When a the-
ory attracts enough attention, scientists engage in repeated
episodes of testing and criticism until most of the flaws are re-
moved from the espoused theory.67 This is the process of
the Nobel Prize three years ago, but it has taken many years for his revolutionary idea to be
accepted. See Press Release, The Nobel Assembly at the Karolinska Institute, The 1997 No-
bel Prize in Physiology or Medicine (Oct. 6, 1997), at http://www.nobel.se/medicine/
laureates/1997/press.html; Stanley B. Prusiner-Autobiography (1997) at http://
www.nobel.se/medicine/laureates/1997/prusiner-autobio.html.
62. See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 60, at 100, 157. One author estimated that ninety
percent of the primary literature in physics is wrong. See HENRY H. BAUER, SCIENTIFIC LIT-
ERACY AND THE MYTH OF THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD 48 (1992) (citing opinion of John
Ziman).
63. The rudiments of the scientific method derive from the works of Bacon, Galileo,
and Newton. See Ernan McMullin, The Development of Philosophy of Science 1600-1900, in COM-
PANION TO THE HISTORY OF MODERN SCIENCE 816-28 (R.C. Olby et al. eds., 1990).
64. See MARTIN GOLDSTEIN & INGE F. GOLDSTEIN, How WE KNOW: AN EXPLORATION
OF THE SCIENTIFIC PROCESS 19 (1978); JOHN M. ZIMAN, RELIABLE KNOWLEDGE: AN EXPLO-
RATION OF THE GROUNDS FOR BELIEF IN SCIENCE 6 (1978); Francisco J. Ayala & Bert Black,
Science and the Courts, 81 AM. SCIENTIST 230, 234 (1993).
65. See KARL E POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 44-45, 53-54 (1972).
66. See, e.g., SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY
IN AMERICA 95 (1995); Lars Noah, Sanctifying Scientific Peer Review: Publication as a Proxy for
RegulatoryDecisionmaking, 59 U. Prrr. L. REV. 677, 692 (1998).
67. See Bert Black et al., The Law of Expert Testimony-A Post Daubert Analysis, in EXPERT
EVIDENCE: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO LAW, SCIENCE AND THE FJC MANUAL 37 (Bert Black
& Patrick Lee eds., 1997).
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"falsification," described by Karl Popper in an article cited byJus-
tice Blackmun in Daubert,6e as the driving force that pushes science
away from the erroneous to something closer to the truth. In sci-
ence, the final answer is merely the latest one not yet proven false.
The ability of scientists to establish the reliability of a particular
theory depends on many factors, including presumably the degree
of public and scientific interest in the subject matter, the funding
available for studies, the level of interest generated among experts
in the field, the quality and completeness of the original data
made available, and the novelty of the new concept. In the best
scenario, all of the above factors will come together to generate a
large body of replicated studies confirming or refuting a range of
health-related conclusions that ultimately achieve widespread pub-
lication and a general scientific consensus. Far more common,
however, are the many obscure theories/studies that are published
in second- or third-tier journals and never receive any significant
attention or criticism. 69
Litigation-related science, because it is typically novel, tends to
fall into the latter category.7 ° If a litigation-based methodology or
theory is sufficiently provocative and important from a public
health standpoint, it can generate significant review, commentary,
and critical examination by the scientific community.7' Ultimately,
the processes referenced by the Daubert Court work relatively well
after the issue has received sufficient attention to generate other-
wise disinterested university or privately-sponsored research. 72 Early
68. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (citing KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS:
THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989)). Popper espouses a theory of
"critical rationalism" that requires scientific propositions to be formulated to permit other
scientists tot attempt to falsify them. By surviving such scrutiny, the propositions gain credi-
bility. See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 60, at 19-20.
69. See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 60, at 162 & n.32.
70. As examples, note the published epidemiological work in Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor
Alkali Co., 921 F. Supp. 666 (1996), supra text accompanying note 29, attempting to establish
undocumented toxic effects of toluene, and the in vitro studies published to support novel
birth defect theories in Bourne v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., supra text accompanying
notes 27-28. In these cases, there was no existing literature (outside the litigation context)
to support these novel theories, and the published articles attracted little scientific atten-
tion.
71. The experiments performed by Dr. Anderson in Ruffin v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 149
F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 1998), attracted the attention of Congress, EPA, and other researchers. See
supra text accompanying notes 14-15. Likewise, the breast implant cases, after lengthy litiga-
tion, finally generated enough concern for researchers at the Mayo Clinic to conduct a
comprehensive epidemiological study in 1994. See ANGELL, supra note 59, at 100; S.E.
Gabriel, Risk of Connective-Tissue Diseases and Other Disorders after Breast Implantation, 330 NEW
ENG.J. MED. 1697-1702 (1994).
72. For example, at least three reported breast implant cases were dismissed on
Daubert standards after a scientific panel convened to examine the issue released a report
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in any health-related litigation, however, neither the scientific in-
terest nor widespread public scrutiny will have taken place.73
Instead, the early lawsuits in any health case are often based on
unproven conjecture derived from a limited base of regulatory or
other studies, or perhaps merely from case reports or alleged asso-
ciations of exposures and conditions. More to the point of this
Article, novel lawsuits may also draw from a new expert study or
theory developed and funded by the litigants.7 5 Until the cases ex-
pand into a national health issue, the scientific scrutiny referenced
by the Supreme Court will likely be very limited. By the time the
national interest is captured, it is often too late and the conse-
quences of mushrooming litigation may have already compelled
massive settlements and bankruptcies before the scientific verdict
is even rendered.6
In the interim, courts faced with the initial cases must decide
what to do with novel science. It is at this point that courts and liti-
gants must understand something of the processes used by
scientists to conduct "falsification." The degree to which the novel
theory has been subjected to one or more of these processes will
determine the comfort level of the court in admitting or excluding
the evidence under Daubert. The more important processes are
described below.
Informal collaboration: Researchers often run their theories by
their colleagues or work in collaboration to ensure errors are
showing that there was no association between silicone breast implants and connective tis-
sue or autoimmune disease. See Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1311 n.9
(11th Cir. 1999); Grant v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 97 F. Supp. 2d 986, 989-90 (D. Ariz. 2000);
Bushore v. Dow Coming-Wright Corp., No. 92-344-CIV-T-26C, 1999 WL 1116920, at *5
(M.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 1999).
73. See POPPER, supra note 68.
74. The Benlate eye defect cases discussed above, supra note 21, are good examples.
Plaintiffs initiated those cases after the United Kingdom news media in 1993 reported that
Benlate was associated with alleged "clusters" of children born with no eyes in farming re-
gions of England and Scotland. Based on these allegations and well-known rat studies
showing eye defects through high-dose gavage exposure, plaintiffs began legal proceedings
against DuPont. The government of the United Kingdom commissioned a study, published
in the British MedicalJournal that ultimately found no evidence of "clusters" in any region of
England. H. Dolk, et. al., Geographical Variation in Anophthalmia and Microphthalmia in
England 1988-1994, 317 BRIT. MED.J. 905-09 (1998).
75. All of the cases discussed in Section I involved a novel allegation of injury (e.g.,
birth defects from use of fertility drug in Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89 F.3d 594 (9th
Cir. 1996), or the toxic carpet effects in Ruffin, 149 F.3d at 294).
76. In the breast implant litigation, thousands of lawsuits had been filed, verdicts of up
to $25 million rendered, and the biggest class action settlement in history reached, all be-
fore the first epidemiological study dealing with breast implants was published in 1994. See
ANGELL, supra note 59, at 10. The study found no relationship with the alleged injuries. Id.
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eliminated.77 To the extent a researcher acts alone, or collaborates
with colleagues who are not suitably disinterested, the risk of error
and potential bias increases. Legitimate collaboration, on the
other hand, will often flag problems in the study or in the applica-
tion of the scientific method to the author's work.
Professional workshops- Many professional groups conduct confer-
ences and workshops at which researchers can present their
findings early in the process, ordinarily even before publication
takes place. Plenary presentations receive the most attention, ab-
stracts and poster presentations far less. Sometimes a professional
society will publish the plenary presentations through a related
journal. In some instances, a novel theory may receive consider-
able discussion and generate either widespread disagreement or a
consensus among the society members. This form of "peer review"
has been going on since the 1700s, when the Royal Society in Lon-
don and other scientific societies regularly debated new papers
and scientific ideas. 1 If a novel theory is a sufficiently dramatic de-
parture from the existing body of knowledge, the proponent's
failure to submit it to the relevant society for consideration may be
considered a major weakness in a Daubert analysis. 9
Good laboratory practice (GLP): Laboratories performing work for
regulatory purposes (especially those for Food and Drug Admini-
stration or Environmental Protection Agency review) are required
to conform to strict laboratory protocols that help ensure a lack of
error and trustworthy results. s° The regulators will reject studies
that do not meet these criteria, and the result may well be the dis-
approval of the drug or other product."' Because of the financial
77. See Black et al., supra note 67, at 41 (referencing collaboration as a form of "in-
formal" peer review).
78. See David A. Kronick, Peer Review in 18th Gentury Scientific Journalism, 263 JAMA
1321-22 (1990).
79. See Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 E3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir. 1995)
[Daubert II] (criticizing plaintiffs' expert for failing to "publish[] his work on Bendectin in a
scientific journal or solicit[] formal review by his colleagues" despite ten years of litigation).
On the other hand, the majority of papers presented at conferences are not thoroughly
vetted at the conference and never end up in publication. See Roberta Scherer et al., Full
Publication of Results Initially Presented in Abstracts, 272 JAMA 158, 161 (1994) (only one-half
of ophthalmology abstracts ultimately published); Dan B. Murrey et al., Publication Rates of
Abstracts Presented at the 1993 Annual Academy Meeting, 359 CLINICAL ORTHPAEDICS & RE-
LATED RESEARCH 247, 248-49 (1999). For this reason, the mere presentation of a paper at a
conference, by any means, should not be viewed as a thorough form of peer review. See
Black v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 19 F Supp. 2d 592, 600 (S.D. W. Va. 1998) (presentation at
two symposia rejected as sufficient peer review for Daubert admissibility).
80. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. Part 58 (good laboratory practices for drug applications); 40
C.FR. § 158.70, 158.80 (referencing protocols for pesticide application testing).
81. FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 60, at 100-01.
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implications of poorly documented studies, company laboratories
are generally careful about the GLP quality of their work.2
GLP standards are more rigorous than those used by university
laboratories. GLP standards, however, are not necessarily a sine qua
non of acceptable research. "' Many laboratories conduct valid stud-
ies without strict application of GLP. 4 Nonetheless, research
undertaken outside the contours of GLP or other rigorous stan-
dards may require closer scrutiny in litigation to ensure that
researchers have utilized proper processes, quality control, and
• 85
documentation.
Grant funding requirements: If grant money is required, the appli-
cant must meet the standards of the funding organization to
obtain the grant.8 6 Those standards generally include measures to
ensure that the research will be properly conducted and free of
obvious flaws."' Approval of a rigorously reviewed grant is helpful
in establishing the reliability of the study." Denial of grant fund-
ing, however, must be interpreted carefully since promising
82. See id. at 174-75.
83. Although FDA requires GLP, see generally 21 C.F.R. Pt. 58, it implicitly acknowledges
that good scientific studies may be conducted without adherence to GLP by allowing for the
submission of petitions not conducted according to GLP if the petitioner can explain why
GLP was not used. See e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 7 1.1(g); 21 C.F.R. §101.7(c); 21 C.F.R.
§ 170.35(c) (1) (iv).
84. See Allan S. Felsot, Numbers, Numbers Everywhere-And Not a Drop of Meaning, 13 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 91, 110 (1998) ("While data derived from GLPs and CLPs may be
tracked by an independent third party (e.g., an auditor), they do not guarantee that the
best available technology is used, nor that the design of experiments is optimal. Thus, the
data may be auditable, but its quality may still be open to question.") (citing Maureen S.
Barge, Good Laboratory Practices and the Myth of Quality, in Goon LABORATORY PRACTICES: AN
AGROCHEMICAL PERSPECTIVE 41, 41-46 (Maureen S. Barge & Willa Y Gardner eds. 1988)).
85. Id. at 109 (explaining that the genesis for good laboratory practices "grew out of
fraudulent data collection cases"); FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 60, at 101 (noting that be-
cause GLP standards "enforce standardized experimental methods and standardized
methods of collecting and reporting data, they are effective in reducing 'data dredging,'
'data torturing.' 'cargo cult science,' 'pathological science,' and other abuses").
86. See generally NIH Grants Policy Statement (Revised March 2001), available at
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy
87. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 289(a) (requiring peer review of NIH grant applications);
Exec. Order No. 12,372, 3 C.F.R. § 197 (1982) (providing external review requirements of
applications for federal scientific research funding); U.S. Public Health Service, Grants
Policy Statement, http://www.grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/nihgps/ (advocating the use of
peer review as a means of choosing grant allocation requests).
88. NIH, for example, requires organizations applying for grants to disclose and ad-
dress any potential conflicts of financial interests. Id. at 51. Like other government agencies,
NIH has a number of civil and criminal penalties at its disposal to use against researchers
who falsify information or engage in research misconduct. Id. at 32-34, 55-56. Finally, NIH
conducts its dual peer review of grants applications thus ensuring that some peer review
takes place. Id. at 34-37.
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projects may be denied funding for reasons separate and apart
from the merits of the proposal.
Publication peer review.. After a study is completed, the researcher
may elect to submit the results in a written article to a relevant
journal. Ideally, the article will undergo peer review by external
experts in the field, whose comments will require changes or fur-
ther demonstration of validity and will ultimately determine
whether the article is published or not.89 There are thousands of
scientific and medical journals in the world, however, and many
cannot fill their pages. 90 The resulting seller's market means that a
researcher can publish even an inadequate article somewhere. 1
Serious and adequate publication peer review remains relatively
rare. Even adequate publication peer review is sometimes limited
in that the review may involve only one or two peer reviewers, and
even the best reviewers can only identify gross errors in methodol-
ogy or conclusions. 2 Because of its inherent limits, publication
peer review should be considered essentially a screening mecha-
nism useful (if properly performed) for weeding out some forms
of truly bad science but generally insufficient to test thoroughly
the methodologies used and theories set forth.93
The publication peer review process is critical to the evaluation
of novel litigation science because it is likely to be the primary
means by which the proponents of the research claim scientific
acceptance of their methodologies and theories. Because the pub-
lication process is vital for litigation-generated science, we discuss
it in more detail in the following section.
Post-publication analysis and comment If the subject of the article is
important enough, a published article will generate letters to the
editor, commentary, criticism, and replication attempts by others.
This is "peer review" in the broader and more comprehensive
sense-the process by which ideas are exposed to other scientists
89. See ANGELL, supra note 59, at 95 (noting that publication peer review is necessary
to weed out errors caused by the natural biases and subjectiveness of even the best-
intentioned author); Ayala & Black, supra note 64, at 234-39.
90. See, e.g., Noah, supra note 66, at 699 (identifying 25,000 journals in the biomedical
field alone) (citations omitted).
91. See STEPHEN LOCK, A DIFFICULT BALANCE: EDITORIAL PEER REVIEW IN MEDICINE
39-41, 85 (1985).
92. See Noah, supra note 66, at 696 & n.89.
93. Publication peer review is incapable, for instance, of identifying fraud, manipula-
tion, or statistical or methodological errors not identified in the article itself because the
peer reviewers do not have access to the underlying research data. See FOSTER & HUBER,
supra note 60, at 100 (discussing inability of peer reviewers to catch data manipulation). See
generally id. at 70-109 (discussing types of scientific errors found in reported and published
studies).
[VOL. 34:4
Daubert's Backwash
and subjected to falsification efforts. True "peer review" and "gen-
eral acceptance," in the Daubert sense, has not occurred until this
process takes place and the broader scientific community has had
the opportunity to scrutinize and test the theory first put forth
through publication peer review.
4
Regulatory revie'. A large group of studies are never submitted
for publication at all because they are conducted by researchers on
behalf of companies attempting to obtain regulatory approval of
their products. The lack of publication, however, does not mean
these studies are unusable for Daubert purposes. In fact, the con-
verse is true, because the review these studies receive at the hands
of the regulatory agencies is often more intense than that offered
by journal publication.95 As one example, the underlying data and
test documentation for a regulatory study must be available and
transparent because the agencies can request to see the data if
necessary, whereas journal peer reviewers rarely see any underlying
data for submitted articles.96 Indeed, there is a growing overlap be-
tween regulatory approval and peer review. Federal regulators are
placing increased reliance upon peer-reviewed articles when mak-
ing regulatory decisions.97 Advisory panels and other forms of peer
review are also entering into the regulatory approval process.98 In
94. See Black et al., supra note 67, at 41-42. As the Court in Daubert stated: "Publication
... is but one element of peer review .... [Slubmission to the scrutiny of the scientific
community is a component of 'good science,' in part because it increases the likelihood
that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (citations omitted). Even when there has been sufficient time
for post-publication analysis and comment, courts must pay attention to whether the audi-
ence that receives the journal is sufficiently qualified to allow their review of the publication
to be considered "scientific review" for purposes of Daubert. See United States v. Plaza, 179 E
Supp. 2d 492, 508-09 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (in a case challenging finger printing analysis, the
court expressed concern that, even though there have been numerous writings discussing
fingerprint identification techniques, those at the top of the field are skilled professionals
but they do not have any "advanced academic training" to be considered a "'scientific com-
munity' in the Daubert sense.").
95. See FosTER & HUBER, supra note 60, at 174.
96. See Suzanne R. Hill, et al., Problems with the Interpretation of Pharmacoeconomic Analy-
sis, 283 JAMA 2116-2121 (2000); Drummond Rennie & Harold S. Luft, Pharmaco-Economic
Analyses: Making them Transparent, Making them Crediblt 283JAMA 2158-2160 (2000).
97. See SHEILAJASANOFF, THE FIFrH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS 33-
36 (1990); Noah, supra note 66, at 679; Thomas S. Burack, Note, Of Reliable Science: Scientific
Peer Review, Federal Regulatory Agencies, and the Courts, 7 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 27, 35
(1987); see also Nancy S. Bryson & Richard J. Mannix, Good Science, Junk Science, and Regula-
tory Science: Is There a Role for the Daubert Guidelines in Administrative Rulemaking, 8
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT 89,89-92 (1998).
98. See 7 U.S.C. § 136w(d)-(e) (Supp. V 1999) (peer review of pesticide studies); 21
U.S.C. § 360c(b) (Supp. V 1999) (FDA medical device classification panels); 21 U.S.C.
§ 379e(b)(5)(C) (Supp. V 1999) (FDA's color additive advisory committee); 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(i)(13) (Supp. V 1999) (peer review for research conducted under Superfund); 42
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addition, Congress has begun to recognize the importance of and
establish standards for regulatory peer review.9
In addition to the GLP requirements discussed above, regula-
tory studies must meet detailed standards in terms of design and
reporting. Regulatory studies are also evaluated through the skep-
tical eye of regulators whose job it is to ensure public safety.'00
Shortcomings in the research will cause the studies to be rejected,
and the product would ordinarily not be approved as a result.'°'
Moreover, unlike publication review, companies and individuals
are subject to debarment from future projects, civil penalties, and,
in severe cases, criminal prosecution if they falsify data or commit
fraud on government agencies.' °2
While scientists can rely on any or all of the above to pursue fal-
sification, there is no standard path through these processes or any
particular point at which the novel theory or methodology is de-
clared valid. At some point, assuming the novel approach merits
attention at all, the cumulative weight of various approvals, cou-
pled with decreasingly successful falsification efforts, erodes the
need for or interest in further challenges. Courts should assess the
degree to which a novel litigation-driven approach has been tested
under the above processes and the degree of the scientific com-
munity's confidence in the resulting theory or methodology.
B. Publication Peer Review
Publication peer review is the most likely venue for testing the
reliability of novel litigation science. It is a readily accessible means
for litigation experts to obtain some measure of "general accep-
tance" and peer review in a short time frame. In the scientific
publishing world, however, publication peer review is an amor-
U.S.C. § 289(a) (1994) (peer review of NIH grant applications); 21 C.ER. § 14.100 (2001)
(listing FDA's standing advisory committees).
99. See, e.g., Science Integrity Act, H.R. 574, 106th Cong. (1999); Regulatory Im-
provement Act of 1999, S. 746,106th Cong. (1999).
100. Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999: Hearing on S. 746 Before the Senate Comm. on Gov-
ernmental Affairs, 106th Cong. 174-75 (1999) (statement of D. Lynn Johnson, Vice-
President, Eastman Chemical Co.).
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., 21 C.ER. § 312.70 (2001) (FDA disqualification procedures for submitting
false drug data); 21 C.F.R. § 812.30 (2001) (FDA disqualification procedures for submitting
false medical device data); 42 C.ER. § 50.101 (2001) (HHS standards for misconduct in
science); 45 C.F.R. § 689.1 (2001) (National Science Foundation standards for misconduct
in science and engineering).
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phous beast that is currently undergoing a great deal of scrutiny.
Neither courts nor scientists should blithely assume that publica-
tion in a purportedly "peer-reviewed" journal is a seal of approval
for a particular methodology or theory."3
1. The Growth and Use of Peer Review in Journal Publication-In
1989, two authors published the first historical surveys of peer re-
view, largely in response to an extended effort by one of the
authors of this Article to generate research on peer review prac-
tices. 0 4 Those histories trace the beginnings of journal peer review
to the early 1700s, when scientific and professional societies fore-
shadowed journal peer review by requiring review of memoirs for
publication in the records of their proceedings. 0 5 In the interven-
ing two centuries, the development of peer review has been
sporadic and disorganized. 06 In fact, up until World War II, few
journals referred articles to outside specialists for review, relying
instead on staff editors and officers of specialized journals, or on
the editors' sometimes hard-headed notions of their own exper-
tise. °7 Journals had difficulty finding enough articles, and the
scientific and medical professions were still experiencing a general
opposition to the specialization that later spurred the growth of
peer review.' 8
The pressures that led to "modern" peer review-referral of ar-
ticles to outside specialists for review-grew primarily from the
need for greater expertise as scientific and medical knowledge and
processes expanded. The luxury of separating the wheat from the
chaff through external peer review was not an option, however,
until after World War II,' 9° when the quantity of available articles
increased to the point that at least the better journals could afford
to reject a large proportion of submissions."0 Even then, the prac-
tice tended to be a realistic option only for those journals-
typically the better ones-that did not have to scramble to fill their
103. A full dissection of the status of scientific peer review is beyond the scope of this
Article. For additional surveys of the publication peer review, see Noah, supra note 66.
104. See John C. Burnham, The Evolution of Editorial Peer Review, 263 JAMA 1323, 1323
(1990); Kronick, supra note 78.
105. See Burnham, supra note 104, at 1323-24.
106. See Kronick, supra note 78, at 1321-22.
107. See Burnham, supra note 104, at 1324-25 (recounting the story of one editor, the
owner of the Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease through the first half of the 20th century,
who refused to accept any authority other than his own even in the subfields of neurology
and psychiatry).
108. Id. at 1325.
109. See Ann C. Weller, Editorial Peer Review in U.S. Medical Journals, 263 JAMA 1344
(1990) (citing DJ. PRICE, LrrrLE SCIENCE, BIG SCIENCE... AND BEYOND (1986)).
110. Burnham, supra note 104, at 1325, 1327.
SUMMER 20011
638 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 34:4
publications. Nor did peer review reforms spread evenly or gener-
ally across journals, as might be expected. Instead, each journal
tended to find its own way independently, with little regard to the
practices of other journals."'
2. Publication Peer Review Practices and Limitations-In the last
decade, the scientific publishing community has begun to evaluate
peer review and publication practices for consistency and validity.I"2
These efforts have disclosed the variety of peer review practices in
use and highlighted the limitations of peer review in identifying
flawed research. The limitations in the institution of publication
peer review are severe enough that some commentators now talk
about the "game" of peer review thatjournals play and the bureau-
cratic process that has grown up around it."3 While no one has
recommended doing away with publication peer review altogether,
institutional reform is needed.
4
111. The initial investigations into peer review resulted from events that called into
question the ability of journals to keep flawed science out of their publications. See, e.g.,
Arnold S. Relman & Marcia Angell, How Good Is Peer Review?, 321 NEw ENG.J. MED. 827, 828
(1989); Drummond Rennie, More Peering into Editorial Peer Review, 270 JAMA 2856(1993).
From time to time, as would be expected in any human endeavor, the pressures to publish
lead to unethical or questionable publishing practices and the publication of erroneous or
even fraudulent work. Some of these incidents have been highly publicized.
112. Since 1986, one of the authors of this Article has written extensively to encourage
scientific inquiry into the validity and quality of peer review. See Drummond Rennie, Prob-
lems in Peer Review and Fraud: Cleave Ever to the Sunnier Side of Doubt, in 'BALANCING ACT'
ESSAYS TO HONOR STEPHEN LOCK 9-19 (1991); Mildred K. Cho et al., Masking Author Identity
In Peer Review: What Factors Influence Masking Success ?, 280 JAMA 243 (1998); Amy C. Justice
et al., Does Masking Author Identity Improve Peer Review Quality? A Randomized Controlled Tria
280 JAMA 240 (1998); Drummond Rennie & Annette Flanagin, Congress on Biomedical Peer
Review: History, Ethics, and Plans for the Future, 280 JAMA 213 (1998); Drummond Rennie,
Editorial Peer Review in Biomedical Publication: The First International Congress, 263 JAMA 1317
(1990); Drummond Rennie, Editorial Peer Review: Let Us Put It on Trial, 13 CONTROLLED
CLINICAL TRIALS 443 (1992); Drummond Rennie et al., Fourth International Congress on Peer
Review in Biomedical Publication: Calfor Research, 282JAMA 1085 (1999); Drummond Rennie,
Freedom And Responsibility in Medical Publication: Setting the Balance Right, 280 JAMA 300
(1998); Drummond Rennie, Guarding the Guardians: A Conference on Editorial Peer Review, 256
JAMA 2391 (1986); Drummond Rennie & Elizabeth Knoll, Investigating Peer Review., 109
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 181 (1988); Drummond Rennie, More Peering into Editorial
Peer Review, 270 JAMA 2856 (1993); Drummond Rennie et al., Peer Review in Prague, 280
JAMA 214 (1998); Drummond Rennie & Annette Flanagin, Peer Review in Prague: The Inter-
national Congress on Peer Review and Global Communications, 1994, 274 JAMA 986 (1995);
Drummond Rennie et al., The International Congress on Peer Review in Biomedical Publication,
261 JAMA 749 (1989); Drummond Rennie & Annette Flanagin, The Second International
Congress on Peer Review in Biomedical Publication, 272 JAMA 91 (1994); Richard Smith &
Drummond Rennie, And Now, Evidence Based Editing, 311 BRIT. MED.J. 826 (1995).
113. Elizabeth Knoll, The Communities of Scientists and Journal Peer Review, 263 JAMA
1330, 1331 (1990).
114. See, e.g., Noah, supra note 66, 703 & n.108 (1998). One particular author published
at least twelve fraudulent papers, including one in the prestigious New England Journal of
Medicine, before being exposed. See W. Whiteley et al., The Scientific Community's Response to
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Some of the problems with peer review's screening capacity are
inherent in the process. Peer reviewers, for instance, are wholly
dependent on the veracity of the researcher in the conduct of the
underlying research. Reviewers often do not see anything other
than what the researcher includes in the article and therefore can-
not confirm any of the findings." 5 Underreporting of data may be
relatively prevalent, but it is difficult to ascertain during peer re-
view. Studies finding a result are far more likely to be published
than those in which nothing happens, even though the latter can
be of equal or even greater scientific value. H6 In addition, authors
can "slice and dice" the results, selectively report data (intention-
ally or not) to emphasize certain outcomes, or leave out
populations whose study results are less interesting."7
The flaws inherent in one set of humans reviewing another's
work are also of concern. Authors often fear that the reviewers,
intentionally or not, may be biased against them, their institutions,
or their theories. Reviewers, in turn, have to worry about backlash
against their criticisms if the reviews are unblinded. If the reviews
are blinded, reviewers' criticisms may be unchecked and insuffi-
ciently critiqued. Even apart from bias and the like, peer review is
a subjective process that can result in considerable variation across
reviewers." 8 One study found that reviewers showed only a modest
ability to detect intentional flaws consistently in test manuscripts
and in fact identified only a minority of such flaws." 9
In addition to the weaknesses inherent in publication peer re-
view, the history of peer review development has left a patchwork
of highly variant practices. The term peer-reviewed publication is fre-
quently used as if it described a monolithic process, applied by all
Evidence of Fraudulent Publication, 272 JAMA 170 (1994); see also Philip M. Boffey, U.S. Study
Finds Fraud in Top Researcher's Work on Mentally Retarded, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1987, at A16;
Eugene Garfield & Alfred Weljams-Dorof, The Impact of Fraudulent Research on the Scientific
Literature, 263JAMA 1424 (1990).
115. SeeRelman &Angell, supra note 111, at 828.
116. lain Chalmers, Underreporting Research Is Scientific Misconduct, 263JAMA 1405, 1407
(1990) (citing Kay Dickersin, The Existence of Publication Bias and Risk Factors for Its Occurrence,
263 JAMA 1385, 1385-89 (1990) and R.J. Simes, Confronting Publication Bias: A Cohort Design
for Meta-Analysis, 6 STAT. MED. 11, 11-29 (1987)). Underreporting of data is believed to be
very prevalent. See Drummond Rennie & Annette Flanagin, Publication Bias: The Triumph of
Hope Over Experience, 267 JAMA 411, 411-22 (1992).
117. SeeChalmers, supra note 116, at 1407.
118. See Michael L. Callaham et al., Reliability of Editors' Subjective Quality Ratings of Peer
Reviews of Manuscripts, 280 JAMA 229, 230 (1998) (twenty percent of variance in reports
attributable to reviewers).
119. Id.
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respectable journals. 20 To the contrary, peer review practices can
differ in a number of respects, any one of which can affect the
quality of the review. A sampling of important but highly variant
practices includes:
External vs. internal review:. Three-fourths of the journals reviewed
in one study use their own editorial board members as reviewers."'
This approach is potentially inconsistent with the sine qua non of
modern peer review, i.e., review by specialized experts external to
the author and publication's own editors and board.
2 2
Selection of reviewers- Outside reviewers, if used, can be selected
from a journal database (large or small), from personal acquaint-
ances or meeting contacts, or even from recommendations by the
authors themselves.22 Some journals will even change referees
when requested by the author. 
4
Blinding. The reviews can be "double-blind," meaning neitherS •• 125
the reviewers nor the authors know each others' identities, or
they can be single-blind (the reviewers are told the authors'
names)1 6 or not blinded at all (the authors also learn the review-
ers' names) .27 The degree of blinding might affect the objectivity
of the review, but the research on this point is not yet clear.'
28
120. Laypersons who assume uniformity would not be alone, because many medical
journal editors themselves also assumed uniformity of practice until the last decade. See
Weller, supra note 109, at 1344 (citing LOCK, supra note 91).
121. Cynthia D. Good et al., A Worldwide Assessment of Medical Journal Editors' Practices
and Needs-Results of a Survey by the World Association of Medical Editors, 89 S. AnR. MED.J. 397,
400 (1999).
122. See id. at 400; Lois A. Colaianni, Peer Review in Journals Indexed in Index Medicus, 272
JAMA 156, 157 (1994). The British MedicalJourna in contrast, maintains a file of 2000 out-
side reviewers that it calls upon for specialized topics. See Stephen Lock, What Do Peer
Reviewers Do., 262 JAMA 1341, 1341 (1990). Further, only forty-four percent of journals re-
ported that they consistently obtained external epidemiological and statistical reviews of
published research, leaving open the possibility of inadequate review in these areas as to the
otherjournals. Good, supra note 121, at 400.
123. See Weller, supra note 109, at 1345 and Table 1.
124. See Lowell L. Hargens, Variation in Journal Peer Review Systems, 263JAMA 1348, 1349
(1990).
125. See id. (the Astrophysical Journal uses double-blind reviewing); Weller, supra note
109, at 1345 (thirty-two percent of a group of interdisciplinary and specialized journals
remove the author's name before submission to the reviewers).
126. Single-blind reviews are used exclusively, for instance, among the sixteen top clini-
cally-oriented journals. See Weller, supra note 109, at 1345 (referred to as "anonymous"
review).
127. Only a small percentage ofjournals studied by Weller used fully non-blinded re-
views (both authors' and reviewers' names revealed). Id.
128. The cited articles and others have to date explored the degree and types of blind-
ing used but have not generated data as to the effects of blinding practices on the quality of
the review.
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Intensity of the review process The number of "referee cycles"
(transmittals between reviewer/editor and author to make
changes) that a manuscript undergoes also varies, not just for indi-
vidual articles, which could be explained by the quality of the
initial drafts, but also across journals."9 The variation could indi-
cate differences in editing rigor."°
Available resources: The resources devoted to peer review can vary
greatly. Smaller journals cannot match the resources of journals
like the New England Journal of Medicine, which has seven full-time
physician editors, six part-time physician specialists, three statistical
consultants, and thousands of outside peer reviewers at its dis-
posal. 3'
Decision-making. The outside reviewers can participate in a con-
sensus publication decision with the journal's editors, and many
journals solicit the external reviewers' opinions on publication.
Most reviewers, however, do not directly participate in the publica-
tion decision, which is the province of the journal editors alone.
32
Rejection rates: The rejection rate of articles also varies dramati-
cally. 3' 3 As some have argued, the rejection rate of a journal may
well be a direct measure of the quality of the journal's peer review
practices.
1
3
4
Journals vary widely in how they communicate their peer review
practices to their readers. Two recent surveys, for instance, found
that of the 94 percent of journals claiming to be peer reviewed, 3 5
actual evidence of such peer review existed in only 38 to 55
129. See Hargens, supra note 124, at 1348-49.
130. Id. at 1349.
131. SeeANGELL, supra note 59, at 95-96 (1996).
132. Hargens, supra note 124, at 1349; Weller, supra note 109, at 1345, 1346 tbl. 5.
133. Chemistry and physics journals rejected a mere fifteen percent and thirty percent,
respectively, of submitted articles, while the behavioral science journals rejected seventy to
ninety percent. See Hargens, supra note 123, at 1348. A 1990 study found similarly large
discrepancies among a reputable astronomyjournal (eighteen percent rejection), a zoology
publication (forty-one percent), and a sociology journal (eighty-seven percent). Id. Weller
also found a statistically significant difference in rejection rates between her two categories
of journals. Weller, supra note 109, at 1346 & tbl 5. The rejection discrepancies would be
more palatable if they were related to the number of submissions received. Instead, they
appear consistent for individual journals regardless of fluctuations in submission rates. Har-
gens, supra note 123, at 1348.
134. See Drummond Rennie, The Present State of MedicalJournals, 352 THE LANCET SII 18,
SII 19 (1998). In some instances a low rejection rate may indicate a more passive-aggressive
form of ensuring quality by requiring repeated revisions until an author simply gives up.
One highly respected astronomy journal, for instance, almost never officially rejects articles
that receive a negative review, but instead continues to require revisions until the article
passes muster or the author gives up. Hargens, supra note 123, at 1351.
135. Good et al., supra note 121, at 400.
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percent of the sampled journals. 16 Investigators also found that
among the "peer-reviewed" journals, less than half of their
published articles actually included a statement implying that the
article had been peer reviewed. 1' Even then, the descriptions of
the process were so vague and uninformative that no court or
litigant could possibly determine on the face of the journal exactly
what the notion of "peer review" for that particular article might
mean. 38 If journals are not fully or adequately describing whether
and how an article has been peer reviewed, the legal profession
will find itself considerably adrift in attempting to match
publishing practices with the dictates of Daubert.
The historical patchwork of peer review practices across journals
is no mere annoyance for those who rely on Daubert. What might
have been a clean, bright-line rule disintegrates at best into an-
other area requiring time-consuming discovery, court inquiry,
balancing tests and, at worse, into a false notion of reliability.
3. The Vancouver Group and the Uniform Requirements-The inves-
tigations into the quality of peer review have led to the growth of a
movement to ensure consistent peer review and disclosure prac-
tices across journals, primarily through the Uniform Requirements for
Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals ("Uniform Requirements").
The meetings of journal editors that eventually led to the Uniform
Requirements began rather quietly in 1978 as a means of establishing
a consistent format forjournal submissions. Called the "Vancouver
Group" after its initial meeting place, the journal editors published
their first formatting requirements in 1979.13
Subsequently, the Vancouver Group expanded and changed its
name to the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors
("ICMJE").' 40 The ICMJE gradually took on a broader mandate
than mere publication form, ultimately establishing uniform crite-
ria regarding acceptability, confidentiality, identification of
authors, and most importantly, peer review and conflicts of inter-
est. The ICMJE has published seven versions of the Uniform
142Requirements since 1979, the latest in 2001. The authors of the
136. Colaianni, supra note 122, at 157.
137. Id.
138. Id. The author found such descriptions as "subject to peer review," "sent to two
specialists," "to aid referring," and "are reviewed."
139. INT'L COMM. MED.J. EDS., UNIFORM REQUIREMENTS FOR MANUSCRIPTS SUBMITTED
TO BIOMEDICAL JOURNALS, at http://www.icmje.org (last modified Oct. 2001) [hereinafter
UNIFORM REQUIREMENTS].
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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Uniform Requirements claim that over 500 journals currently sub-
scribe to the Uniform Requirements,1 43 but it is uncertain in fact how
many journals actually follow the practices and how faithful their
adherence is.
144
The Uniform Requirements are primarily a functional set of direc-
tions to obtain consistency in manuscript format and submissions
across journals. To date, the Uniform Requirements have addressed
peer review by including a definition of a "peer-reviewed journal"
and a requirement that the journal disclose its peer review prac-
tices:
A peer-reviewed journal is one that has submitted most of its
published articles for review by experts who are not part of
the editorial staff. The number and kind of manuscripts sent
for review, the number of reviewers, the reviewing proce-
dures, and the use made of the reviewers' opinions may vary,
and therefore each journal should publicly disclose its poli-
cies in its instructions to authors for the benefit of readers
and potential authors. 145
This provision addresses two of the peer review concerns dis-
cussed above. First, the authors of the Uniform Requirements dealt
with inconsistency in the use of outside reviewers by establishing
external review, i.e., by editors not part of the journal staff, as the
basic requirement of a peer-reviewed journal. This in itself was a
major step, and many journals still do not require external review
for all articles. Second, the Uniform Requirements chose to address
the vast array of peer review practices utilized across journals, not
by requiring consistency, but by recognizing the inconsistency and
requiring disclosure of those practices in the journal. Thus, apart
from external review, journals adhering to the Uniform Requirements
may still engage in widely varying peer review practices, but they
will presumably disclose those practices in some form available to
the reading public.
A number of leading journal editors have convened three
international congresses on peer review practices since 1989 to
encourage research into peer review and the identification of
143. Id.
144. Studies on author conformity with the Uniform Requirements show a great diver-
gence of recognition and practice. See Drummond Rennie et al., The Contributions of Authors,
284 JAMA 89, 89-91 (2000); Drummond Rennie et al., When Authorship Fails: A Proposal to
Make Contributors Accountable, 278JAMA 579, 579-585 (1997).
145. UNIFORM REQUIREMENTS, supra note 139.
SUMMER 2001 ]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 34:4
practices that are effective at screening out invalid research."'
These efforts may allow the profession to add more specificity to
the Uniform Requirements regarding peer review. Until then, the
value of the Uniform Requirements in promoting consistency among
journal practices will remain fairly limited.
Litigants dealing with articles published in journals that sub-
scribe to the Uniform Requirements can at least be assured of some
external review, although the quality of review and number of re-
viewers is still an issue. Moreover, at least in theory, litigants
dealing with a journal that conforms to the Uniform Requirements
can identify the scope of the review from the journal's disclosure
of its practices. Most articles likely to be the subject of novel sci-
ence litigation, however, will not find their way into the more
prestigious journals, but will be published among the many jour-
nals that do not subscribe to the Uniform Requirements. Until more
journals use the Uniform Requirements, and perhaps until the Uni-
form Requirements contain more detailed prescriptions, the
Requirements will serve primarily as a minimal benchmark for ex-
ternal review and disclosure of practices.
4. The Role of Bias and Disclosure in Publication Peer Review-The
role of potential bias and nondisclosure of conflicts by article au-
thors has become a focal point of the recent turmoil in the
publishing world regarding peer review. Potential bias among au-
thors is inherent in the world of research, because studies cost
money and must be funded by someone. When that funding
comes from any source with an interest in the outcome, a potential
conflict or bias arises. The recent concerns over peer review have
encompassed numerous articles on the nature of author conflicts,
the impact of conflicts on article validity and acceptability, and the
need for disclosure.
147
Some of the heightened scrutiny of potential conflicts is the re-
sult of several highly publicized incidents resulting from the
146. See Drummond Rennie & Annette Flanagin, Congress on Biomedical Peer Review: His-
tory, Ethics, and Plans for the Future, 280 JAMA 213 (1998); Drummond Rennie, Editorial Peer
Review in Biomedical Publication: The First International Congress, 263 JAMA 1317 (1990);
Drummond Rennie, The Second International Congress on Peer Review in Biomedical Publication,
272JAMA 91 (1994). Each of these volumes of JAMA contains a number of research articles
regarding peer review that were presented at the respective conferences.
147. See, e.g., Erdem I. Cantekin et al., Biomedical Information, Peer Review, and Conflict of
Interest as They Influence Public Health, 263JAMA 1427 (1990); Sheldon Krimsky & L.S. Roth-
enberg, Financial Interest and Its Disclosure in Scientific Publications, 280 JAMA 225 (1998);
Sheldon Krimsky et al., ScientificJournals and Their Authors'Financial Interests: A Pilot Study, 67
PSYCHOTHERAPY & PSYCHOSOMATICS 194 (1998);John C. Morris, Conflicts of Interest: Research
and Clinical Care, 8 ALZHEIMER DISEASE & ASSOCIATED DISORDERS 49 (1994); Michael S.
Pritchard, Conflicts of Interest: Conceptual and Normative Issues, 71 ACAD. MED. 1305 (1996).
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publication of articles without disclosure of conflicts. For example,
the Los Angeles Times recently disclosed that the prestigious New
England Journal of Medicine had published a key drug survey article
without disclosing that the author was a consultant to the drug
company. 14 Following the media exposure, the Journals editors
conducted a self-audit and learned that the Journal had published
nineteen other articles by authors with ties to pharmaceutical
companies and without disclosing the potential conflict. 49 Al-
though no issues were raised regarding the articles' contents or
findings, the credibility of both the articles and the Journal was
questioned because of the apparent conflict and its nondisclosure.
Similarly, in 1990 a Boston newspaper excoriated the Journal of the
American Medical Association for publishing an editorial in 1990 on
post-pertussis vaccination encephalitis without disclosing the au-
thor's role as a paid consultant and testifying expert for the drug
company. As it turned out, the author himself failed to disclose
that relationship on his signed disclosure forms.' 50
Journals are taking steps to avoid the credibility backlash of un-
disclosed conflicts. The Uniform Requirements, for instance, declare
that "[p] ublic trust in the peer review process and the credibility of
published articles depend in part on how well conflict of interest is
148. See Terrence Monmaney, Medical Journal's Article Raises Conflict Concerns; Research:
Positive assessment of anti-balding drugs was written by a professor who has worked for makers, LA.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 1999, at Al (criticizing V.H. Price, Treatment of Hair Loss, 341 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 964,964-73 (1999)).
149. See Marcia Angell & Alastair J.J. Wood, Authors' Conflicts of Interest: A Disclosure and
Editors' Reply, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1618-19 (1999); Marcia Angell et al., Disclosure of Au-
thors' Conflicts of Interest: A Follow-up, 342 NEW ENG.J. MED. 586 (2000); Kelly M. McMasters,
Disclosure of Authors' Conflicts of Interest-A Follow-up, 343 NEW ENG.J. MED. 146 (2000); Vera
H. Price, Authors' Conflicts of Interest: A Disclosure and Editors' Reply, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1618 (1999); Terrence Monmaney, Top Medical Journal Admits 19 Lapses of Ethics Policy, LA.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2000, at Al.
150. See Vincent Garbitelli, Pertussis Vaccine Encephalopathy, 264 JAMA 2385 (1990) (let-
ter to the editor/comment criticizing James D. Cherry, Pertussis Vaccine Encephalopathy: It Is
Time to Recognize It As the Myth That It Is, 263 JAMA 1679-80 (1990)); Marie R. Griffin et al.,
Pertussis Vaccine Encephalopathy, 264 JAMA 2385-86 (1990) (letter to the editor/comment);
James E. Lewis, Pertussis Vaccine Encephalopathy, 264 JAMA 2383-84 (1990) (letter to the
editor/comment); John H. Menkes, Pertussis Vaccine Encephalopathy, 264 JAMA 2384-85
(1990) (letter to the editor/comment); John A. Tilelli & Robert L. Manniello, Pertussis
Vaccine Encephalopathy, 264JAMA 2385 (1990) (letter to the editor/comment); see alsoJames
D. Cherry, Pertussis Vaccine Encephalopathy, 264 JAMA 2386 (1990) (letter to the edi-
tor/comment from the author of the original article). Illustrating the great difficulty with
loosely enforced and voluntary disclosure rules, the editors of JAMA also learned that the
author of the editorial had testified twelve times on the issue, and authors of numerous
letters written to protest the referenced editorial had themselves failed to identify their own
extensive litigation roles on this issue. Drummond Rennie, Pertussis Vaccine Encephalopathy,
264 JAMA 2386 (1990) (editorial noting that various physicians writing to protest had re-
spectively testified, for remuneration, once, 20 times, 25 times, and 39 times on the issue,
but did not reveal that information until pressed byJAMA's editors to do so).
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handled during writing, peer review, and editorial decision mak-
ing."'5' The Uniform Requirements contain a comprehensive
description of potential conflicts, defined as:
[T]ies to activities that could inappropriately influence [the
researcher's] judgment, whether or not judgment is in fact
affected. Financial relationships with industry (for example,
through employment, consultancies, stock ownership,
honoraria, expert testimony) either directly or through
immediate family, are usually considered to be the most
important conflicts of interest. However, conflicts can occur
for other reasons, such as personal relationships, academic
competition, and intellectual passion.5 2
Some journals, representing one end of the spectrum, simply re-
fuse to accept certain types of submissions (e.g., review articles)
from authors with conflicts of interest.15 3 Most journals, however,
are content to require disclosure, publish the articles if they are
otherwise worthy, and allow the reading public to judge the impact
of the potential conflict. The Uniform Requirements, for instance,
require authors to disclose "financial and other conflicts of interest
that might bias their work. They should acknowledge in the manu-
script all financial support for the work and other financial or
personal connections to the work." 54 Peer reviewers and editors
are likewise required to disclose conflicts.
5 5
Beyond the basic tenets of the Uniform Requirements, the disclo-
sure obligations journals place on authors are limited and
inconsistent. Journals that do not follow the Uniform Requirements
often do not require any disclosure or account for or report the
author's potential biases, no matter how severe. 156 Even among the
151. UNIFORM REQUIREMENTS, supra note 139.
152. Id.
153. See id.; Eliot Marshall, Journals Joust over Conflict-of-Interest Rules, 276 SCIENCE 524
(1997) (New England Journal of Medicine bans editorials by anyone with a financial stake in
the subject). The focus of the Journats ban is on review articles, in which the author has
great discretion in selecting information, greatly increasing the opportunity for bias to in-
fluence the conclusions.
154. UNIFORM REQUIREMENTS, supra note 139.
155. Id.
156. One survey found that less than one-third of the journals identified in Uhlrich's
International Periodicals Directory required any sort of conflict disclosure. See Richard M.
Glass & Mindy Schneiderman, A Survey of Journal Conflict of Interest Policies, INT'L CONGRESS
ON BIOMEDICAL PEER REv. & GLOBAL COMM., at http://www.ama-assn.org/public/
peer/apo.htm. The percentage of journals requiring disclosure increased with circulation
size. Id. Another study found that only thirty-nine percent of journals surveyed required
disclosure of conflicts of interest. Good et al., supra note 122, at 397.
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journals that utilize the Uniform Requirements, there is variation in
the degree of disclosure and the reporting of conflicts. For exam-
ple, the JAMA has relatively strict disclosure requirements, 57 but
even those requirements are confined to financial interests. The
Lancet's requirement that authors disclose to the editors "anything
... that would embarrass [the author] if it were to emerge after
publication" and "financial and other conflicts of interest that
might bias [the author's] work" 8 is less specific but arguably re-
quires broader disclosure than JAMA. The British MedicalJournas
website, taking the minimalist approach, simply requires that the
technical editor of the article include the "source of funding" in
the edited version, but actual articles contain fairly thorough dis-
closures of financial and other conflicts.1 59 A few leading journal
editors have even debated the value of bias disclosure and have
recommended that disclosure be entirely voluntary and not a con-
dition of acceptance.160
Authors engaged in litigation science obviously have potential
conflicts of interest. They may have served, or expect to serve, as
paid, testifying experts in litigation. Even if not, the lawyers or a
party to the litigation may have funded the research, helped
develop the protocol and design, provided the raw materials
needed, or reviewed and commented on the results and the
article. Some of the journal disclosure requirements discussed
above would require disclosure of litigation involvement.
Nonetheless, most journals would probably not require any
disclosure, and fewjournals explicitly reference litigation activity as
157. The "Financial Disclosure" section of JAMA's author instructions requires authors
to "certify that all my affiliations with or financial involvement (e.g., employment, consul-
tancies, honoraria, stock ownership or options, expert testimony, grants or patents received
or pending, royalties) with any organization or entity with a financial interest in or in finan-
cial competition with the subject matter or materials discussed in the manuscript are
completely disclosed" and that "all financial and materials support for this research and work
are clearly identified in the manuscript" JAMA, MANUSCRIPT CRITERIA & INFORMATION, at
http://jama.ama-assn.org/info/auinst.html (last modified Jan. 5, 2000) [hereinafter JAMA
WEBSITE].
158. THE LANCET, WRITING FOR THE LANCET, at http://www.thelancet.com/authorinfo
(last visited Oct. 15, 2001) [hereinafter THE LANCET WEBSITE]. The Lancet Website provides as
well that "[aill sources of funding must be disclosed, as an acknowledgement in the text."
Id.
159. BRIT. MED. J., CHECKLISTS, at http://www.bmj.com/advice/33.html (last visited
Sept. 25, 2001). See, e.g., Rumona Dickson et al., Effects of Treatment For Intestinal Helminth
Infection on Growth and Cognitive Performance in Children: Systematic Review of Randomised Trials,
320 BRIT. MED. J. 1697, 1700 (2000) (disclosing that author was "currently supported by
Unicef and the World Bank to carry out a trial of anthelmintic drugs in children" and that
"[n]o author is currently receiving support from drug companies manufacturing
anthelmintics").
160. See Marshall, supra note 153, at 524.
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a potential conflict. ' ' The lack of direct reference to litigation
conflict probably reflects the scientific community's relative lack of
focus on the existence of litigation science as a prime source of
potentially biased research.
III. COURT APPROACHES TO PUBLICATION PEER REVIEW
AND LITIGATION SCIENCE
Because of the emphasis under Frye and Daubert on peer review
and general acceptance, courts have become familiar with the sci-
entific method and have learned to look to scientists for help in
assessing the validity of scientific propositions. In the growing
number of instances in which a party has proffered litigation sci-
ence, some courts have recognized the need for enhanced scrutiny
to eliminate biased or improper studies. A particular focus on the
quality and extent of peer review, both publication and otherwise,
has led these courts (for the most part) to reject litigation science
because of its unreliability.
A. Daubert and Other Caselaw Approaches to Peer Review
Most courts are familiar with the concept of peer review gener-
ally and have addressed whether a scientific methodology has been
adequately peer reviewed under both the Frye and Daubert stan-
dard.
Long before Daubert, federal courts realized the necessity of
looking to the scientific community to determine whether a scien-
tific expert's opinion was generally accepted and thus admissible.
6
1
The standard for admitting scientific, technical, and medical tes-
timony was the "general acceptance" test first enumerated in Frye v.
United States. 63 In Frye, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia established the yardstick for legal acceptance as the point
of scientific acceptance:
161. JAMA is an exception. SeeJAMA WEBSITE, supra note 157 (requiring disclosure of
.expert testimony").
162. See, e.g., State v. Bullard, 322 S.E.2d 370, 376 (N.C. 1984) (looking to independent
research in determining whether proffered evidence is reliable); State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d
80, 84 (Iowa 1980) (existence of specialized literature is relevant to the admissibility deter-
mination of a novel approach).
163. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult
to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force
of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go
a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently estab-
lished to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs.'64
Thus, courts applying this standard were asked to decide ques-
tions of admissibility by deferring to the opinions of non-litigation
scientists in the relevant field.
Publication and peer review by a scientific journal has long been
a hallmark in determining whether expert testimony had gained
general acceptance in the relevant community. Under Frye and its
various incarnations, courts in both civil165 and criminal'66 contexts
reviewed various types of expert evidence in an effort to determine
whether the relevant expert community sufficiently approved of
the methodology utilized by the challenged expert. In certain
cases, the issues presented required the court to discuss explicitly
whether a scientific methodology had been the subject of sufficient
peer review to warrant its admission into evidence. Courts consid-
ered many of the same factors in assessing the quality of peer
164. Id. at 1014.
165. See, e.g., Ellis v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 302 (4th Cir. 1984) (reversing the
lower court's decision to exclude from evidence toxic shock syndrome studies carried out
by the federal Center for Disease Control as well as other state health organizations); Smith
v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 1561, 1579 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (relying on several pub-
lished studies finding no causal link between vaginal spermicide and certain birth defects in
rejecting expert testimony to the contrary); Shield Club v. City of Cleveland, 647 F. Supp.
274, 284 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (citing the existence of published or unpublished literature on
the subject as a factor in the court's Frye analysis).
166. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 557 (6th Cir. 1977) (excluding testi-
mony discussing ion microprobic analysis because the prosecution's experts were unable "to
cite any authority in the field in support of their positions"); United States v. Stifel, 433 F2d
431, 440-41 (6th Cir. 1970) (admitting expert testimony utilizing neutron activation analysis
based substantially on the court's reading of articles on the subject); United States v. Maivia,
728 F. Supp. 1471, 1474 (D. Haw. 1990) (citing various studies of spectrographic voice iden-
tification before concluding that such evidence was admissible in a criminal prosecution);
United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 689-90 (D.D.C. 1972) (relying on published stud-
ies to support the admission of polygraph examination results); People v. Sandy, 544 N.E.2d
1248, 1256 (Ill. App. 1989) (permitting expert testimony on "Tin Ear Syndrome" after not-
ing other experts had discussed this theory and that the expert's theory had been
published). Cf United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978) (admitting
testimony relying on spectrographic voice analysis despite being provided with a list of ten
doctors in favor and seventeen opposed to the admission of such testimony in the court-
room).
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review support for an opinion that are applicable today under
Daubert.
Daubert changed the landscape of expert evidence admissibility,
but not so much that the original landscape is unrecognizable. If
anything, the Daubert Court strengthened the need to rely on sci-
entific processes to determine the validity of new science and
justify its admissibility as courtroom evidence.
Under a Daubert analysis, the trial court must first determine
"whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony
is scientifically valid.' ' 167 This prong is generally referred to as the
"reliability" test.1 61 Second, the trial court must determine "whether
[the expert's] reasoning or methodology properly can be applied
to the facts in issue.' 169 This part of the inquiry has become known
as the "fit" test.
70
As to the reliability test, all four of the non-exclusive factors
7
'
the trial court should consider relate to the falsification process
• 172 T
that scientists undertake to eliminate erroneous theories. Two of
the four criteria focus on the broad concept of "peer review."
The first of the broad peer review questions is "whether the the-
ory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
167. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). The Court
noted that the "inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method" and "sup-
ported by appropriate validation ... based on what is known." Id. at 590. The Court defined
scientific validity to be an examination of whether "the principle support[s] what it purports
to show." Id. at 590 n.9. Later, the Court discussed the advantages of the scientific method:
"[t] he scientific project is advanced by broad and wide-ranging consideration of a multitude
of hypotheses, for those that are incorrect will eventually be shown to be so, and that in
itself is an advance." Id. at 597. Peer review, of course, advances the ability of scientists and
other experts with scientific or technical knowledge to review a theory or methodology and
point out its shortcomings.
168. Reliability and validity have independent and different meanings to a scientist, but
the Court seemed to use them interchangeably. For purposes of this Article, we do not try to
follow the scientific distinctions but refer either to the validity or reliability of a scientific
proposition as the measure of its trustworthiness for evidentiary purposes.
169. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
170. Id. at 589, 591-92.
171. The Court later refused to establish a rule that "for all cases and for all time" lower
courts must consider and apply each of the Daubert factors. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137, 150-51 (1999) ("Too much depends upon the particular circumstances of the
particular case at issue. Daubert itself is not to the contrary. It made clear that its list of fac-
tors was meant to be helpful, not definitive.").
172. The four criteria are (1) "whether a theory or technique ... can be (and has
been) tested;" (2) "whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication;" (3) "the known or potential rate of error and the existence and maintenance
of standards controlling the technique's operation;" and (4) whether the theory or tech-
nique has gained general acceptance in the scientific community. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-
94.
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publication," a familiar inquiry under the old Frye cases.'73 The
Court adequately recognized several important concepts that in-
variably apply to peer review and that should qualify any court's
reliance on publication peer review for admissibility:
(1) Peer review involves more than just publication.
Publication is a useful first indicia of some peer re-
view, but as the Court stated, "[p]ublication ... is
but one element of peer review.' 7 4 In other words,
courts need to look beyond the simple fact that an
article appears in a medical or scientific journal.
(2) Publication itself "does not necessarily correlate
with reliability.', 7 5 Some of the amicus and other
briefs submitted to the Court emphasized the wide
variability in publication practices and the possibil-
ity that bad science can readily find a publisher.
(3) Not all acceptable theories will necessarily have
undergone publication peer review. 76 The Court
identified theories that are too innovative to be
173. Id. at 593. In its discussion, the Court relied heavily on scientific articles that ad-
dressed the advantages and disadvantages of peer review. See id. at 593-94 (citingJASANOFF,
supra note 97, at 61-76; JOHN ZIMAN, RELIABLE KNOWLEDGE: AN EXPLORATION OF THE
GROUNDS FOR BELIEF IN SCIENCE 130-33 (1978); and David Horrobin, The Philosophical Basis
of Peer Review and the Suppression of Innovation, 263 JAMA 1438 (1990)); see also Relman &
Angell, supra note 111, at 828.
174. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 594. In dictum, several courts have espoused examples of situations where
validation through published studies may not be needed. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (Daubert I1) (citing examples such as
fingerprint analysis, voice recognition, DNA analysis and other "scientific endeavors closely
tied to law enforcement"); Virgin Islands v. Byers, 941 E Supp. 513, 524 (D.V.l. 1996) (aside
from publication, "the FBI has made its database and findings available to scientists for
independent review"). In Cavallo v. Star Enterprises, the court stated that published studies
may not be needed "where the temporal connection between exposure to a given chemical
and subsequent injury is so compelling as to dispense with the need for reliance on stan-
dard methods of toxicology... [or where] a known chemical is accidentally introduced into
a company's ventilation system, and all of the workers exposed immediately develop the
same adverse reaction." 892 F. Supp. 756, 773-74 (E.D. Va. 1995); see also Daubert I1, 43 F.3d
at 1313-14 (causation can be proved when there is "compelling proof that the agent must
have caused the damage somehow" and using an example of fifty people eating at a restau-
rant on one night and all getting food poisoning shortly thereafter); Nat'l Bank of
Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 E Supp. 1490, 1496-97 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (quoting same
language from Daubert I1). The Supreme Court provided a more straightforward example of
a situation where "the particular application at issue may never previously have interested
any scientist." Kumho, 526 U.S. at 151. Even when an issue may have never interested scien-
tists, the expert's opinion may still be excluded in certain circumstances. See United States v.
Scholl, 959 E Supp. 1189, 1194-95 (D. Ariz. 1997) (in a tax case, an expert testified that the
study of pathological gambling was the "step child of addiction" studies; no studies existed
measuring whether a gambler can discern whether he won money gambling).
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acceptable to publishers, or perhaps "too particular,
too new, or of too limited interest to be
published.17 The Court could well have mentioned
also the many studies created for regulatory
purposes for which publication is not a necessity for
establishing reliability or for which publication may
not be possible due to concerns about proprietary
data.
178
Nevertheless, the Court gave great weight to "submission to the
scrutiny of the scientific community" as a component of good sci-
ence "because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in
methodology will be detected." 179 In other words, scientific scru-
tiny-including publication peer review-contributes to the
falsification of bad ideas.
The Court continued the theme of scientific scrutiny through
peer review in the last of the four reliability criteria, general accep-
tance. The Court recognized that "general acceptance" "can yet
have a bearing on the inquiry" by identifying "a relevant scientific
community and an express determination of a particular degree of
acceptance within that community."0 Conversely, " 'a known tech-
nique which has been able to attract only minimal support within
the community,' may properly be viewed with skepticism."' 81
Though the Court used the more familiar legal terminology, the
concept of "general acceptance" clearly refers to the process of
broad peer review by experts in the field through which a theory
or technique has successfully navigated the falsification process.182
The Supreme Court gave less attention to the "fit" requirement
(and perhaps for that reason so have the practitioners and lower
177. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 ("[I]n some instances well-grounded but innovative theo-
ries will not have been published.... Some propositions, moreover, are too particular, too
new or of too limited interest to be published."); see also Black et al., supra note 67, at 42
(recognizing that where disclosure could compromise a competitive advantage, a com-
pany's strong internal controls could satisfy the requirement for peer review).
178. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
179. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. Indeed, courts have noted situations where peer review
has found flaws in a theory. See e.g., Daubert II, 43 E 3d at 1314 ("Every published study here
and abroad-and there have been many-concludes that Bendectin is not a teratogen.");
Frank v. New York, 972 F Supp. 130, 135 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Peer review of the MCS [multi-
ple chemical sensitivity] theory has revealed a host of flaws in the theory, warranting
skepticism as to the validity of MCS.").
180. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
181. Id. (citation omitted).
182. More recently, the Supreme Court has made clear that the Daubert factors-
including peer review-apply even if the expert is not testifying about scientific matters.
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 157 (1999) (examining whether any articles or
papers validate the challenged expert's approach).
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courts), but as discussed later, that requirement is also important
in reviewing litigation science. The Court described "fit" as an is-
sue of relevance, i.e., "whether expert testimony proffered in the
case is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the
jury in resolving a factual dispute.' 8 3 Using an example of the
phases of the moon, which might help if the issue is the darkness
of the night but will not help if the issue is the rationality of a per-
son's behavior, the Court concluded that "Rule 702's 'helpfulness'
standard requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent in-
quiry as a precondition to admissibility."84 Litigation science may
be perfectly valid, but its findings may not be relevant to the issues
in the case or contribute to the scientific problem facing the court.
The risk from such research is that the expert may attempt to ex-
tract a principle from it that is relevant but is not supported by the
research. Such testimony should be excluded under Daubert's reli-
ability prong because it lacks any support in the scientific
community, and the research itself should be excluded under the
"fit" prong because it will not be helpful to the trier of fact.
Following Daubert, many courts, including state courts, have
agreed with the importance of the broad peer review process in
helping determine whether an expert opinion is reliable. As
summarized by the Texas Supreme Court:
Publication and other peer review is a significant indicia of
the reliability of scientific evidence when the expert's testi-
mony is in an area in which peer review or publication would
not be uncommon .... One legal commentator has suggested
that the ultimate test of the integrity of an expert witness in
the scientific arena is "her readiness to publish and be
damned." ... Further, the "examination of a scientific study
by a cadre of lawyers is not the same as its examination by
183. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. In the context of this article, the "fit" component may be
used to ensure that the methodology of an expert's interpretation of a peer reviewed article
is correct. See Metabolife Int'l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 E3d 832, 844 (9th Cir. 2001).
184. Id. at 591-92.
185. For a summary of state courts applying and rejecting Daubert, see Frederick T.
Smith, Daubert and Its Progeny: Scientific Evidence in Product Liability Litigation, WASHINGTON
LEGAL FOUNDATION 69-101 (2000).
186. The peer review component gains increased importance in cases where the chal-
lenged expert relies solely upon a review of literature and does not perform any original
research or testing-thus making the testing and rate of error components of a Daubert
analysis inapplicable. See Mitchell v. Gencorp, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 592, 599 (D. Kan. 1997);
United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant, Inc., 173 F.R.D. 675, 628 (D. Kan. 1997); see
also Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1996); Daubert II, 43 F.3d at
1311.
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others trained in the field of science or medicine."...
[P]ublication is [not] a prerequisite for scientific reliability in
every case, but courts must be "especially skeptical" of scien-
tific evidence that has not been published or subjected to
peer review... Publication and peer review allow an oppor-
tunity for the relevant scientific community to comment on
findings and conclusions and to attempt to replicate the re-
ported results using different populations and different study
designs.""
Even courts that still operate under the Frye standard after
Daubert have continued to examine whether peer review, and espe-
cially publication peer review, establish that the expert's
methodology is generally accepted within the relevant expert
community 88 In Berry v. CSX Transportation, Inc., the Florida Court
of Appeals' decision to admit expert testimony on epidemiological
studies was strongly influenced by the fact that those studies were
peer reviewed and published in widely acknowledged medical and
scientific journals. 9 The court concluded that, "[w]hile the exis-
tence of numerous peer-reviewed, published, epidemiological
studies does not guarantee that the studies are without flaws, such
publication here alleviates the necessity of thorough judicial scru-
tiny of each study at the admissibility stage to sort out the disputes
over methodologic errors in studies."' 90
B. Court Review of Litigation Science
Contrary to some early predictions,' 9' most of the experts whose
testimony has been challenged and excluded under Daubert have
been plaintiffs' experts.1 92 In response and in order to improve
187. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 726-27 (Tex. 1997) (internal
citations omitted).
188. See, e.g., People v. Leahy, 8 Cal. 4th 587, 611-12 (1994); Castrichini v. Rivera, 669
N.Y.S.2d 140, 144 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997); State v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 456-57 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1994).
189. Berry v. CSX Transp., Inc., 709 So. 2d 552, 569-70 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998).
190. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
191. See e.g., Michael D. Green, Relief at the Frying of Frye: Reflections on Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., I SHEPARD'S EXPERT & Sci. EVIDENCE Q. 43, 47-48 (1993); Barry
J. Nace, Reaction to Daubert, 1 SHEPARD'S EXPERT & Sci. EVIDENCE Q. 51, 51 (1993); G.
Marc Whitehead, Daubert Will Allow More Expert Testimony, Complicate Jurors'Job, Prejudice
Defense, 21 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 41 (Summer-Fall 1993).
192. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence After Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 2139, 2139-40 (1994); Finley, supra note 5,
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their chances of surviving a Daubert challenge, plaintiffs' lawyers
have begun to commission studies and submit them for publica-
tion to peer reviewed journals. The few courts that have
confronted litigation science to date have generally been skeptical
of the value of these studies.
1. The Ninth Circuit's Decision in Daubert on Remand (Daubert
1)-Even before the Supreme Court remanded Daubert to the
Ninth Circuit, the Court of Appeals recognized the risks of litiga-
tion-driven scientific work by noting that the reanalysis relied upon
by plaintiffs' experts in the case was "generated solely for use in
litigation.' ' 94 On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Cir-
cuit stressed that lower courts should consider "whether the
experts are proposing to testify about matters growing naturally
and directly out of research they have conducted independent of
the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions ex-
pressly for purposes of testifying."'9'5 The court stated that research
"conducted independent of the litigation provides important, ob-
jective proof that the research comports with the dictates of good
science ... [because it is done] in the usual course of business and
must normally satisfy a variety of standards to attract funding and
institutional support.'', 9 The court also implicitly cautioned lower
courts to be wary of experts that might be biased towards a particu-
lar opinion because they were being paid for their litigation
work.' 97
The court also recognized, however, that not all research that is
relevant to a particular case can be conducted prior to and inde-
pendent of litigation. 98 In such situations, the court held that the
party proffering the litigation-generated research should provide
other evidence confirming that the expert's methodology "is based
at 351. In any event, it is certainly clear that more lawyers are moving to exclude experts and
judges are granting their motions. SeeJudges Are Excluding More Expert Testimony, LAw. WKLY.
USA, Oct. 30, 2000, at 11 (thirty-two percent of lawyers reported making more motions in
limine regarding expert testimony since Daubert: forty-one percent of judges had excluded
expert testimony, up from twenty-five percent in 1991).
193. See infra Parts I and III.B.3.
194. Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 584 (citing the Ninth Circuit opinion, Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 E2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991)).
195. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 E3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995) (Daubert
I). The Court highlighted the fact that "a scientist's normal workplace is the lab or the
field, not the courtroom or the lawyer's office." Id.; see also id. at 1317 n.5 (noting exceptions
for those involved in law enforcement).
196. Id. at 1317.
197. Id. The court also realized, however, that most experts are paid for their work and
stated that the fact that an expert is being paid "does not necessarily cast doubt on the reli-
ability of his testimony." Id.
198. Id.
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on 'scientifically valid principles.' "'9 The court stated that litiga-
tion-generated research can be demonstrated to be "scientifically
valid" if the expert has subjected his methodology to "normal sci-
entific scrutiny through peer review and publication. The court
indicated that only those studies published in "reputable" 2 1 journals
and subjected to a "bona fide process of peer review" 2°2 would satisfy its
test for scientific validity when the methodology at issue was con-
ducted for litigation purposes.2 02
If the expert's methodology was not developed independent of
the litigation and his research was not published in a reputable
journal with real peer review, the Daubert II court provided the ex-
pert with one last chance of establishing credibility: the expert
must explain his methodology and "point to some objective
source-a learned treatise, the policy statement of a professional
association, [or] a published article in a reputable scientific jour-
nal ... to show that [he has] followed the scientific method, as it
practiced by (at least) a recognized minority of scientists" in the
field of expertise. 4
The Daubert II court thus required independent verification of
the authenticity and validity of litigation-based scientific opinion,
through thorough peer review or other objective measures of va-
lidity.2°5 In this context, both the expert's own attempts (or lack
thereof) to publish his methodology and the publications of others
in the scientific community are relevant considerations for lower
courts to use when assessing whether litigation-generated research
is unbiased and therefore reliable enough for presentation to a
jury.
2. Other Courts-The Daubert II court's concern with litigation
bias is not surprising. Well before Daubert became the federal stan-
dard, courts had expressed concern with the independence of
publications written by interested parties or experts hired during
the course of litigation. In 1985, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit required lower courts to examine the
199. Id. at 1317-18.
200. Id. at 1318 (citing PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM 209 (1991)).
201. Id. (emphasis added).
202. Id. at 1318 n.6. (emphasis added).
203. The court recognized that "[p]eer review and publication do not ... guarantee"
that the reported methodology is valid but stated that publication in a peer-reviewed journal
"increase[s] the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected." Id.
(quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593).
204. Daubert M, 43 F3d at 1318-19.
205. Id. at 1317-18.
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"non-judicial uses to which the scientific technique" is used in as-
sessing the reliability of an expert's proffered testimony. °6 Other
courts also expressed concern that research generated solely for
use in litigation might be biased.2 °7
In the context of the learned treatise exception to the hearsay
rule, one court summed up the same concerns that courts must
address today in dealing with the reliability of an expert's opinion
under a Daubert analysis:
jT]he primary justification for admitting such evidence ... is
predicated upon consensus that learned treatises are inher-
ently more trustworthy than customary forms of hearsay. ...
This view is founded upon a recognition that learned treatises
are ordinarily written for members of the author's profession
and, therefore, the author is thought to have no motive to
misrepresent the material construed therein. A powerful in-
centive exists to publish a work which will be accepted by the
other members of the author's profession as a fundamentally
sound and authoritative exposition of the subject. Where,
however, the author publishes an article with a view toward
litigation, or where he possesses a personal interest in a liti-
gable matter, a probability of bias exists which undermines
the logic supporting the admission of this material in evi-
208dence as an exception to the rule against hearsay.
Courts have expressed similar concerns in considering other
hearsay exceptions for studies conducted for the purposes of litiga-
tion.2°
When considering the admissibility of an expert's testimony un-
der Daubert, a number of courts, including both state2 10 and federal
206. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1239 (3d Cir. 1985).
207. See Perry v. United States, 755 F.2d 888, 892 (11 th Cir. 1985) (noting that examina-
tion of a study by lawyers is not the same as by those trained in the field of science);
Johnston v. United States, 597 E Supp. 374, 415 (D. Kan. 1984) ("[T]hese witnesses say and
conclude things which, in the Court's view, they would not dare report in a peer-reviewed
format.").
208. See O'Brien v. Angley, 407 N.E.2d 490, 493-94 (N.J. 1980).
209. See People v. Huyser, 561 N.W.2d 481 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a medi-
cal expert's report of examination did not satisfy the business records exception when the
examination was conducted solely for the purposes of litigation and his findings could not
be duplicated in a subsequent examination).
210. See, e.g., Berry v. CSX Transp., Inc., 709 So. 2d 552, 560, 569 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998);
Harris v. Cropmate Co., 706 N.E.2d 55, 65 (Il1. App. Ct. 1999); Williams v. Hedican, 561
N.W.2d 817, 831 (Iowa 1997); McDaniel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn. 1997);
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 714 (Tex. 1997) (non-judicial uses of
the methodology). But see Ford Motor Co. v. Ammerman, 705 N.E.2d 539, 554 (Ind. Ct.
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courts outside of the Ninth Circuit,21l have examined whether an
expert's proffered studies or opinions were generated during liti-
gation. While these courts do not address the propriety of
submitting for peer review studies that were conducted for the
purposes of litigation, they have expressed grave concerns with the
reliability of studies that were conducted solely for the purposes of
litigation and not for some other independent basis.
Following the Daubert H court's concern with the independence
of opinions formed during litigation, a number of courts have ex-
cluded expert testimony based, in part, on the fact that the expert
formed his opinion during the litigation and that the opinion was
not otherwise reliable.1 Not surprisingly, courts have ruled that an
expert's proffered opinion does not satisfy the independence stan-
dard if the expert arrives at his conclusion during the pendency of
related litigation in which he is a paid expert.213 Courts are particu-
App. 1999) (acknowledging the Daubert /I line of cases but declining to consider the issue
under Indiana law).
211. See, e.g., Smelser v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 105 E3d 299, 303 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 817 (1997); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Lit., 35 E3d 717, 742 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994) (dis-
cussing non-judicial uses of the methodology); Downs v. Perstorp Components, Inc., 126 E
Supp. 2d 1090, 1124-29 (E.D. Tenn. 1999) (experts opinion raised seven "red flags" indicat-
ing that his testimony was litigation biased), aff'd, 2002 U.S. App. Lexis 382 (6th Cir. Jan. 4,
2002); Adams v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1102 (S.D. Ind. 1998); Mitchell v.
Gencorp, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 592, 600 (D. Kan. 1997); Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem.
Co., 965 E Supp. 1490, 1516-18, 1526 (E.D. Ark 1996); Dukes v. Ill. Central R.R. Co., 934 F.
Supp. 939, 948 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co., 921 F. Supp. 666, 670
(D. Nev. 1996) (before case, there was "no scientific evidence, published or otherwise, that
inhaling chlorine causes neurological damage").
212. See, e.g., Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1321 (11th Cir. 1999); In re
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 E3d 717, 762 (3d Cir. 1994) (reliance on self reports of pa-
tients who are plaintiffs in litigation); In re Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1203,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1174, at *43-44 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2001); Stasior v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger
Corp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 835, 849-50 (N.D. Il. 1998); In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d
1217, 1234 (D. Colo. 1998) (anecdotal evidence of patients not reliable because patients
were litigants who were referred to the doctor); id. at 1243 (vast majority of expert's busi-
ness came from plaintiffs involved in breast implant litigation); Adams v. Indiana Bell Tel.
Co., 2 F Supp. 2d 1077, 1102 (S.D. Ind. 1998); United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Midland Fumi-
gant, 173 ER.D. 675, 686 (D. Kan. 1997) (analysis done solely for use in litigation); Nat'l
Bank of Commerce, 965 E Supp. at 1516-18, 1526; Dukes, 934 F Supp. at 950-51; Jones v.
United States, 933 F. Supp. 894, 897-98 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Rutigliano v. Valley Bus. Forms,
929 F Supp. 779, 785-86 (D.NJ. 1996) (expert had not tested theory outside of litigation);
Muzzey v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 921 F. Supp. 511, 519 (N.D. IIl. 1996) (opinion
"'grounded on speculation shaped by result-oriented biases;'" no doubt that the "experts
'developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying'") (citations omitted); Lof-
gren v. Motorola, No. CV 93-05521, 1998 WL 299925, at *4, *7 (Ariz. June 1, 1998);
Valentine, 921 F Supp. at 678; Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 726 (Tex.
1997).
213. Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89 E3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1996); Nelson v.
American Home Prods. Corp., 92 F Supp. 2d 954, 959, 968-69 (W.D. Mo. 2000) (noting
that published article was prepared when the expert was a "professional plaintiff's witness"
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larly suspicious of litigation-generated studies when there is evi-
dence that the expert changed his prior position to tailor it to the
issues of the case or the requirements of Dauber?14 or when there is
evidence that the expert will receive a financial payoff if his posi-
tion ultimately prevails.
Consistent with the Daubert II standard, courts have ruled that
when the expert's opinion (or the basis for his opinion) is reached
before the expert became involved in litigation, the expert's opin-
ion is not biased and is thus reliable.1 6 Courts have excluded
expert opinions, however, when the expert purportedly relied
upon non-litigation literature to support his opinion but reached
the opinion before researching the literature,217 or when lawyers
have been forced to educate the expert because the expert had no
prior experience in the area of his testimony.21
A few courts, when faced with unique facts, have excused an
expert for forming an opinion or conducting testing as part of
expected litigation. 29 Even fewer have failed to account for the
and another expert had only made a similar diagnosis in three other patients-all of which
were also made when the expert was testifying against the defendant in related litigation).
214. See Nat't Bank of Commerce, 965 E Supp. at 1517 (noting that expert's opinion for
trial was stronger than that offered in her published articles); United Phosphorus, 173 ER.D.
at 685 (stating that, during hearing, expert abandoned conclusions he reached in his re-
port).
215. Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1034, 1041
(N.D. Cal. 1999) (noting that experts were entitled to share forty percent of proceeds of
litigation until they received four million dollars, and fifty percent thereafter; and excluding
one expert's testimony but allowing the other); cf Castrichini v. Rivera, 669 N.Y.S.2d 140,
145 & n.2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (holding under the Frye standard that the expert, an inventor,
had a commercial interest in publishing articles regarding the successes of his product).
216. Berry v. CSX Transp., Inc., 709 So.2d 552, 560, 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (ex-
pert began studying issue before onset of litigation and his theory was accepted for
publication by peer reviewed journals); Williams v. Hedican, 561 N.W.2d 817, 831 (Iowa
1997) (opinion based upon existing research not generated for litigation).
217. See Sorensen ex rel. Dunbar v. Shaklee Corp., 31 F.3d 638, 649 (8th Cir. 1994); Claar
v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499, 502-03 (9th Cir. 1994); Mitchell v. Gencorp, Inc., 968
F Supp. 592, 600 (D. Kan. 1997); Cartwright v. Home Depot, 936 F Supp. 900, 906 (M.D.
Fla. 1996); Lofgren v. Motorola, No. CV 93-05521, 1998 WL 299925, at *4, *18, *27, *35
(Ariz.June 1, 1998).
218. See Nelson v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 92 F. Supp. 2d 954, 968 (W.D. Mo. 2000)
(noting that the only materials which an expert relied on were those supplied by plaintiff's
lawyers); Lofgren, 1998 WL 299925, at *24; cf Baker v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., No.
95-58737, 1999 WL 811334, at *39 (Tex. Dist. Ct. June 7, 1999) (expert called "hired-gun"
because he did not treat the patient nor did he have any expertise in the field before the
onset of litigation).
219. For instance, one court has held that where "litigation is constant" (on an issue of
abortion rights) and when a Supreme Court opinion essentially invited the subject of the
expert's research, the expert's connection with the litigation would not disqualify his evi-
dence. See A Woman's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 904 F Supp. 1434,
1461 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
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expert's potential litigation bias. In addressing the plaintiff's expert's
rollover test that was not published or otherwise externally reviewed,
the court in Ford Motor Co. v. Ammerman acknowledged that courts
have considered whether methodologies developed independent of
litigation are important indications that the expert's theory is valid. °
The court, however, rejected consideration of litigation bias in
assessing the reliability of the test and opinion and instead relied
upon the adversarial nature of the lawsuit itself, particularly through
"cross-examination and presentation of evidence," to peer review the
test.2 21 Since any expert opinion would be subject to cross
examination, the Ammerman court's holding essentially rendered
meaningless the peer review component of Daubert.22 Such a result
makes no sense and has been rejected by other courts as an
abdication of a court's gatekeeper responsibility.
223
The court in Fitzpatrick v. Louisville Ladder Group L.L. C. held that
an expert's testimony was created independent of litigation be-
cause he presented his theory in three previous cases prior to the
case then before the court.2 2 4 Somehow the court saw this prior tes-
timony as growing independent of litigation. Although his opinion
may have been developed independent of that particular case, it
certainly was not developed independent of litigation. Perhaps real-
izing its earlier mistake, the court ultimately noted that the
expert's testimony "barely passed the admissibility threshold under
Daubert."
2 25
3. Generating Peer Reviewed Publications to Support Litigation-As
discussed in Section I above, research created for litigation-
including its publication in scientific or medical journals-has
220. 705 N.E.2d 539, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
221. Id. Opinions like Ammerman, where the court completely excluded any need for
non-litigation review of a litigation-generated study, are rare in the toxic tort and health-
based product liability context. The Indiana court may have felt less constrained to do so
because the test involved the mechanical performance of an automobile instead of complex
health-based science.
222. United States v. Plaza, 179 E Supp. 2d, 492, 506 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (stating that rely-
ing on " 'adversarial' courtroom testing" would "vitiate the gatekeeping role of federal trial
judges" because "[i]f 'adversarial' testing were the benchmark [under Daubert]-... then
the preliminary role of the judge in determining the scientific validity of the technique
would never come into play").
223. Id.; see also Pietzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., 97 F.3d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1996); In re
Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1203, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1174, *44-45 (E.D. Pa.
Feb.i, 2001) (rejecting argument that a challenged expert's opinion was "peer reviewed"
because it was reviewed by two other experts retained in the case by the same party); Blum v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 705 A.2d 1314, 1322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (cross-examination
cannot be counted on to test speciousness or accuracy of expert's testimony).
224. No. 8:99CV29, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3305, at *14-16 (D. Neb. Mar. 19, 2001).
225. Fitzpatrick v. Louisville Ladder Corp., No. 8:99CV29, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20197, at
*11 (D. Neb. Dec. 6, 2001).
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226
already appeared in a number of recent cases. Courts have been
highly skeptical of such science and have taken a number of steps
to ensure its reliability. For the most part, the proffered studies and
accompanying testimony have been rejected under Daubert.
For example, in National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chemical Co.,
2 27
Plaintiffs expert Dr. Sherman attempted to obtain external verifi-
cation of her studies involving birth defects from pesticide
exposure by publishing two different case report articles in jour-
228
nals. The court was unimpressed. The court first noted Dr.
Sherman's extensive litigation involvement. She had been a litiga-
229
tion consultant and expert witness for twenty years and was a
230
testifying expert in all of the cases at issue. In addition, the re-
search that was the subject of the articles was all litigation-
connected.231 More troubling to the court was the nondisclosure in-
volved in publication. The published articles failed to reveal either
Dr. Sherman's litigation connection or her personal financial in-
232terest in the cases. 2 The court also noted that Dr. Sherman had
"not published her protocols, reasoning or methodology"23 3 and
thus foreclosed any real peer review and possible replication of her
studies. Without this information, other experts in Dr. Sherman's
234field could not subject her theory to scientific scrutiny. Dr.
Sherman also failed to report "the opinion of [other] experts at-
tributing the birth defects to genetic causes,"23 5 thus implying a bias
in the articles and failure to account for competent scientific dis-
agreement with her position. The court concluded that Dr.
Sherman was engaged in advocacy "based on suspicion and conjec-
ture and litigation animus rather than science."
36
Another good illustration of court rigor in reviewing litigation
science is Black v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., in which the challenged expert
presented the results of a litigation-generated study he presented at
two symposia, and thus claimed they were peer-reviewed and viable
226. See, e.g., Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1996) (expert
published an article in non-peer reviewed journal after he became a professional witness in
similar case).
227. 965 E Supp. 1490 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
228. Id. at 1498.
229. Id. at 1516.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1525.
234. See id.
235. Id. at 1517. As further evidence of her bias, the court also stated that Dr.
Sherman's planned testimony before the jury was stronger than that stated in her published
articles. Id.
236. Id. at 1516.
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under Daubert.2 s7 The court did not agree.3 8 In addition to noting
the study's litigation role, the court dissected the plaintiffs' law
firm's involvement in the studies and found that the studies were
shot through with lawyer influence and insinuation.2 3 9 As the court
noted, "[t] he depth and breadth of litigation taint is so substantial
the very validity of the study is compromised."240 None of this
litigation influence was revealed at the symposia,241 thus
undercutting whatever peer review may have occurred at those
proceedings. The court therefore excluded the expert's
242testimony.
Cases like Ruffin v. Shaw Industries, Inc., on the other hand, are
rare. In Ruffin, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals did not need
to inquire deeply into the litigation taint of Dr. Anderson's carpet
tests, which she claimed showed fatal toxicity to rats, because those
tests attracted close inspection by independent sources. 43 In par-
ticular, the United States Environmental Protection Agency
conducted its own set of studies attempting to replicate Dr. Ander-
son's toxicity but could not achieve even mild impacts on the
rats.24 Dr. Anderson's mentor, a professor at the University of
Pittsburgh, also could not completely replicate her results. 245The
courts in the Black and National Bank of Commerce cases had to op-
erate absent any real peer review and thus looked more closely at
the nature of the proffered study, its litigation influence, and ade-
246quate disclosures to the publishing journals. In Ruffin the court
needed none of this because real peer review occurred and dem-
onstrated Dr. Anderson's tests to be flawed. 47 Without question this
is a preferable method of determining the reliability of litigation
science, but courts will rarely have the benefit of such outside re-
view.
Section I described a number of other cases involving litigation
science. Most of these courts rejected the proffered evidence un-
237. Black v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 19 E Supp. 2d 592, 600 (S.D. W. Va. 1998).
238. Id.; see also supra note 79 (discussing inadequacy of conference presentation alone
as basis for peer review), note 282 (abstracts), and note 283 (poster presentations).
239. Black, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 601-02; see also supra text accompanying note 21 for details
of the law firm's involvement.
240. Black, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 603-04.
241. Id. at 600.
242. Id. at 606.
243. Ruffin v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 149 E3d 294, 297 (4th Cir. 1998).
244. Id. at 297-98.
245. Id. at 298-99.
246. See Black, 19 E Supp. 2d at 597, 600-01; Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem.
Co., 965 E Supp. 1490, 1494, 1497-1500 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
247. Ruffin, 149 E3d at 299.
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der a Daubert or Frye standard, typically because the methodology
was not generally accepted, the tests were biased by the litigation
link, and the tests were either not published or the publication oc-
248
curred without disclosure of the litigation connection.
Litigation science is not always rejected, however, particularly if
there is sufficient indicia of external and independent support for
the methodology or conclusions. In Worthington City Schools v.
ABCO Insulation,2 49 an asbestos case in which defendant's expert
authored a published article studying airborne concentrations of
asbestos,5 ° the expert admitted contacting companies for whom he
had previously appeared as an expert witness to utilize the data he
relied upon in those cases.2 5' The expert was the lead author of the
article but did not disclose his role in the pending ltigaion.25
Nonetheless, the court ruled that the article was trustworthy (and
therefore admissible) since it was submitted for peer review and
revised prior to publication.2" The court based its reasoning on the
fact that the expert relied upon other articles-including a gov-
ernment article and articles from the Health Effects Institute and
the World Health Organization-which published similar results.2 4
IV. EVALUATING LITIGATION SCIENCE IN THE SCIENTIFIC AND
LEGAL COMMUNITIES
The Daubert Court attempted to establish a process under which
the legal system could identify and eliminate bad science, primarily
248. See Lust v. Merrell-Dow Pharm., Inc., 89 E 3d 594, 596-98 (9th Cir. 1996) (reject-
ing published opinion on fertility drng teratogenicity because of litigation involvement in
study that was not revealed during publication and because of the absence of any other
publication supporting the expert's opinion); Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co., 921 F.
Supp. 666, 673-75 (D. Nev. 1996) (rejecting published study of litigation-generated study
because of test bias and flaws and failure to prove thorough peer review); E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Castillo, 748 So. 2d 1108, 1116 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting an
expert's in vitro test extrapolations, even though test results were published, because the
expert's extrapolation methodology was not generally accepted under Ftye); O'Brien v.
Angley, 407 N.E.2d 490, 493-94 (Ohio 1980) (article written primarily to express opinion by
testifying physician concerning a litigation issue was untrustworthy as a learned treatise); cf
Worthington City Sch. v. Abco Insulation, 616 N.E.2d 550, 552-53 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)
(admitting study based on data collected in previous litigations on asbestos in buildings).
249. 616 N.E.2d 550 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
250. Id. at 552-53.
251. Id. at 553.
252. Id.
253. See id.
254. See id. (concluding that the admission of the article did not prejudice plaintiff's
case).
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by relying on the processes scientists use to do the same in their
realm. Does the Daubert system work, however, when the science at
issue is no longer generated by independent researchers but by the
very litigants before the court for the sole purpose of achieving
Daubert acceptability? Because of the risk that litigation science
could undermine a Daubert inquiry, we propose that both scientists
and courts heighten their scrutiny and disclosure requirements
when faced with litigation-generated research.
A. The Peculiar Risks of Litigation-Generated Research
It might be tempting to ask why litigation-generated research
should be treated any differently than other research. After all,
fraudulent and conflict-driven research existed long before Frye
and Daubert and wholly independent of the legal process.2 5 Litiga-
tion science may be only another point on the continuum of
studies funded by entities with a vested interest in the outcome.
The litigation process, however, makes litigation science particu-
larly susceptible to the kind of bias and misreporting most likely to
generate unreliable and biased research. Because proponents in
litigation are advocating a particular position, their research does
them no good-and in fact may do serious harm-unless it has an
outcome supportive of that position. The pressure is intense to en-
sure that the test comes out the "right" way. To be sure, this
dynamic exists in milder forms apart from the litigation world,
where researchers have reasons to underreport or misreport
data.2 56 Nothing in the scientific realm, however, begins to ap-
proach the strength and vigor of litigation's dual-sided advocacy,
where there is little room for acknowledging errors, uncertainties,
or the validity of contrary positions.
The advocacy dynamic that permeates litigation also mandates
that the lawyers involve themselves in the research, either directly
or through their testifying expert. That involvement may be
entirely appropriate from a legal standpoint, as it is counsel's job
to make sure the research is relevant to the litigation and will be
defensible on cross-examination. It is easy, however, to imagine
situations in which the legal involvement could become
255. See, e.g., Relman & Angell, supra note 111, at 828; Whitley, supra note 114; Boffey,
supa note 114; Garfield & Welljams-Dorof, supra note 114; supra text accompanying notes
115-17.
256. See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 60, at 95-100 (discussing types of errors com-
monly found in scientific research).
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inappropriate, and even impinge upon the integrity of the
research. In the Black case, for instance, the expert appeared to
exist as a tool of the law firm, and the firm intruded into the study
by, among other things, helping select and process participants
and by implying a litigation reward for study participants.257 Should
the lawyers dictate the protocol, determine the number and type
of controls and test groups, select the statistical analysis used, or
screen the outcomes that will be reported? Even if the legal system
would accept such involvement, scientists would no doubt shudder
at the prospect.
258
The pressure for litigation researchers to conduct a test to
achieve a predetermined outcome is anathema to proper scientific
inquiry. It is fundamental that no research will be conducted to
prove a predetermined point, but will instead be conducted to dis-
prove the null hypothesis. 259 The expected or desired outcome
should not be predetermined, and the results must be accepted for
what they are. Litigation-driven research, if conducted without
proper recognition of the null hypothesis approach, may thus well
subvert the scientific process itself.
The reporting and publishing of litigation science is also prob-
lematic from the standpoint of avoiding unreliable science.
Presumably, a testifying expert desiring to support novel and un-
proven causation theories in court would attempt to publish a
study with the desired outcome in a medical or scientific journal
that claims to be peer-reviewed. Because of the highly variant dis-
closure and peer review practices among journals, particularly with
lower-tier publications, a researcher can always find a willing jour-
nal that will not ask too many questions. 6 Without disclosure and
serious peer review, there is no way to determine on the face of the
published article whether it is in fact litigation-funded and con-
trolled, or whether or how the litigation interests influenced the
study.
Regardless of how scientists or others feel about it, litigation
science is with us for the foreseeable future. The legal system is
tasked with making causation decisions on key public health issues
on which scientists have not yet reached any conclusions. The
stakes are enormous, and if the existing science is inconclusive or
too limited, litigants can be expected to create new science to
257. Black v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 592,601-02 (S.D. W. Va. 1998).
258. See, e.g., ANGELL, supra note 59, at 202-03 (decrying "complicity" of doctors and
lawyers in supporting allegations of injury from breast implants).
259. See GOLDSTEIN & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 64, at 19.
260. See FOSTER& HuBER, supra note 60, at 170; LOCK, supra note 91, at 85.
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support their positions. It is thus critical that both scientists and
the courts adopt approaches to ensure that litigation science does
not infect either system with bad science.
B. Addressing the Risks Posed by Litigation Science
To deal with the risks posed by litigation science, special atten-
tion is required in both the scientific and legal realms. We do not
attempt to address here the merits and efficacy generally of either
the scientific falsification process or Daubert analysis or reforms
needed for either."" Instead, we focus (with the exception of our
proposed Institute for Litigation Research discussed in Section
IV.C) on using existing processes to deal with the unique aspects of
litigation science.
The two primary risks arising from litigation science are the ab-
sence of disclosures that prevent readers from knowing about the
link to litigation and resulting potential bias, and the inability to
determine from a published article whether the study has been
inappropriately manipulated to achieve the desired outcome. On
the front end, scientific and medical publications and other peer
review institutions need to pay increased attention to strengthen-
ing disclosure requirements and developing other means of
forcing litigation researchers to expose their work to full and un-
biased review. On the back end, courts must escalate their Daubert
analysis to ensure that purported peer review is not a sham attempt
to infect the legal system with meritless or biased science. Litigants
who choose to pursue litigation science should do so with the ex-
pectation that it will be scrutinized severely and that it must
conform to the tenets of quality science.
1. Scientific Review of Litigation-Generated Research-Proper ex-
amination of litigation science has to begin with the scientific
community, because the courts are relying in the first instance on
scientists to identify "scientific knowledge" that is sufficiently reli-
able for courtroom usage.262 Beginning with publication and
working through the various forms of post-publication peer review,
scientists need to recognize litigation science as a unique species,
with potential merit but also with special risks.
261. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 185 (surveying Daubert law and identifying outstanding
issues not yet resolved by courts).
262. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
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Requiring full disclosure. Some portion of the scientific world will
likely learn of a particular litigation-based study at the point the
researcher submits the study for publication. At this juncture it is
critical that the journals to which the manuscript is submitted insist
on disclosure of the study's basis in litigation. Initially, the journal
must insist that its authors identify for the journal the nature and
extent of the author's litigation connection. If this disclosure does
not occur, the journal's editors risk being used as pawns by lawyers
sponsoring the research who may not want any serious inquiry into
the study prior to publication. The subsequent disclosure (by
newspapers, for instance) of the litigation connection and any
flaws in the study could be highly embarrassing to the journal.263
Assuming the litigation connection is disclosed, the journal must
then ensure that publication includes an adequate description of
the litigation connection lest the journal be accused of sitting on
potentially relevant and explosive information.
Considering the risks posed by litigation science published
without any disclosure, it is unnerving that a large number of
journals still do not require disclosure of potential conflicts of in-
264terest by their authors. Nor does it seem helpful that a few
eminent editors have argued recently to eliminate or restrict dis-
265closure requirements rather than expand them. Would their
compunction about disclosure change if their journals were con-
fronted with research funded and controlled by lawyers? If the
courts are to obtain the help they need from the scientific com-
munity, it is imperative that disclosure requirements receive
widespread support and implementation in the publishing world.
Ensuring disclosure to peer reviewers: Journals should also ensure
that the litigation connection be conveyed to their peer reviewers.
The reviewers have a right to know whether and to what extent
they should question the unreported aspects of a study and ask for
further citation, confirmation, support, and the like before approv-
ing an article. Currently, there is considerable variation, even
among top journals, as to the information provided to peer
263. Witness the recent experience of the prestigious New England Journal of Medicine,
whose editors had to confess, following a newspaper article's expos6, to a failure to identify
potential conflicts of interest of several authors of a series on new drugs. See supra note 114.
264. See Good et al., supra note 121; Richard M. Glass & Mindy Schneiderman, A Survey
ofJournal Conflict of Interest Policies, INT'L CONGRESS ON BIOMEDICAL PEER REV. AND SCi. PUB-
LICATION, at http://www.ama-assn.org/public/peer/apo.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2001).
265. See Richard Horton, Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research: Opprobrium or Obsession,
349 THE LANCET 1112 (1997); Eliot Marshall, Journals Joust over Conflict-of-interest Rules, 276
SCIENCE 524 (1997); Kenneth J. Rothman, Conflict of Interest: The New McCarthyism in Science,
269JAMA 2782 (1993).
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reviewers. Some in the publishing world believe reviewers should
examine nothing but the merits of the article before them.266 As
the only "experts" to review the article 267 however, peer reviewers
are being asked to sign off on the scientific merit of an article based
on certain assumptions about the underlying work, including that it
was conducted with reasonable impartiality and proper scientific
procedure. It seems reasonable that if the circumstances surround-
ing a study cause it to be particularly suspect with regard to those
assumptions, the reviewers should know that they may not be able
to rely on those assumptions in the same way. They might then re-
quire further disclosure or discussion of study procedures,
publication of more underlying raw data than would ordinarily be
included, an independent statistical analysis, or more caution with
regard to the researchers' conclusions about the findings of the
article.
Scrutiny of the merits and findings: As part of the peer review and
approval process, both the editors and the peer reviewers should
pay careful attention to the merits of the work. Litigation science is
susceptible to false or overreaching statements that are not sup-
ported by the study. These statements are usually found in the
abstract, the introduction, or the discussion sections where authors
sometimes speculate about the import of their work.69 In ordinary
266. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 265, at 1112; Rothman, supra note 265, at 2782, 2784.
Even journals that require disclosure may disclaim that disclosed conflicts affect their
reviews in any way. See Robert Goldwyn, 88 PLASTIC AND RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 323-24
(1991) ("[T]his Editor and the Editorial Board will notjudge the suitability of the article for
publication on the basis of whether the author has or does not have any financial
interests.")
267. In the highly specialized medical and scientific worlds today, even journal editors
rarely have the expertise to dissect the complicated articles that come their way. The in-
crease in specialization since World War II has made it imperative that reputable journals
use experts in the fields addressed by submitting articles for external peer review. See Burn-
ham, supra note 104, at 1324-25.
268. This would likely be a cumbersome process for unpaid, volunteer peer reviewers
who have difficulty finding time to review dozens if not hundreds of articles each year. For
that reason, we propose in Section IV.C, below, an alternative to the traditional peer review
system to deal with litigation science.
269. One study performed in the Bourne litigation, see supra text accompanying note 21,
found no statistically significant effects from pesticide gavage doses. Nonetheless, the intro-
ductory language in the study report contained numerous conclusory, erroneous statements
about the teratogenicity and activity of the fungicide. See Paul Sibbons, Benomyl Toxicology
Study, Study No. 70/4515, at 6-7 (Aug. 10, 1999) (unpublished medical research study, on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). None of the statements were sup-
ported in any scientific literature, but they were consistent with the position of plaintiffs'
chief causation expert. When the lead researcher was deposed, he denied any responsibility
for that portion of the report and testified that it was written by the testifying expert's assis-
tant instead. Deposition of Dr. Paul Sibbons, Study Director, NPMR, Ltd, in London,
England, at 48-64, 78-79 (Oct. 22, 1999) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
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research, such speculation may be harmless ruminating designed
to encourage further thought and study. In litigation science, such
comments have likely been carefully crafted to support the liti-
gants' theories and may range well beyond the actual findings in
the research. Publishers may think these comments unworthy of
attention, but the lawyers may later argue in court that the conclu-
sory statements have been peer reviewed along with the underlying
research.
Reporting the underlying work: The study may also fail to report
adequately the underlying research work. Many articles review only
briefly the procedures and protocol used and the specifics of the
data generated. A good peer-reviewed article will have enough of
this information to help the reviewers assess the propriety of the
methodology and conclusions, but not so much as to make the ar-
ticle unwieldy or unpublishable. Peer reviewers rarely see the bulk
of the underlying study materials and must trust that the research-
ers have conducted the study properly.2 70 Litigation science should
be held to a higher standard requiring expanded disclosure of
procedures and data to protect against biased or selective report-
ing or hiding inappropriate design and practices. The information
reported should, at a minimum, provide enough information to
allow other interested experts to attempt replication of the au-
thor's findings.
Requiring disclosure in publication: If a journal chooses to publish
litigation science, the published article must include disclosure of
the litigation connection and the steps the journal has taken to
ensure that the research has been properly performed and its con-
clusions supported. 2 If the journal does not do so, it will have
become an active participant in foisting potentially biased and bad
27science on the scientific and legal communities. Considering the
Law Reform). Although this study has not been published, it illustrates how a research article
can be manipulated to support litigation in ways that might survive peer review.
270. See Relman & Angell, supra note 111, at 828.
271. The court in National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chemical Co. criticized the published
reports of Dr. Sherman because she did not include information on her protocols, reason-
ing, or methodology. 965 F. Supp. 1490, 1525 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
272. This has in fact been the conclusion of courts that have assessed publication of
litigation-generated research to date. See Black v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 19 E Supp. 2d 592,
600 (S.D. W. Va, 1998) (noting disclosures of litigation connection would be a factor sup-
porting a finding of appropriate peer review); Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 965 E Supp. at 1517
(citing disclosure of litigation connection as a factor in assessing value of peer review of
articles); cf Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89 E3d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1996) (cross-
examination revealed litigation connection of previous article).
273. Consider the opprobrium directed towards prestigious journals such as the New
England Journal of Medicine and the Journal of the American Medical Association for publishing
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risks involved, journals should not be permitted to hide behind
their inadequate or nonexistent disclosure policies. Failure to dis-
close that the journal has published a litigation-funded study is
tantamount to an affirmation by the journal that the study is like
any other and not due any special skepticism, a practice that many
readers would view as at best misleading, if not something worse.
Nondisclosure is such a critical factor that the scientific publish-
ing community should ban the publication of research performed
for purposes of litigation that is not accompanied by proper disclo-
sure when submitted to a journal. The only reason for such non-
disclosure is an attempt to manipulate a scientific publication for
litigation purposes. 74 If journals continue to publish studies with-
out requiring disclosure or reporting the litigation connection, the
publishing community should deal with them in a way that allows
courts to know which journals properly address litigation science
and which do not. A strong statement of disapproval by the scien-
tific community would make litigation researchers think twice
before withholding disclosure when they submit litigation studies
for publication, as any subsequent revelation of those researchers'
nondisclosures could impact their reputation and ability to publish
additional research.
Only the major journals currently engage in any of the practices
suggested above. Even those journals do not require any special
review or attention for litigation science other than disclosure of
potential conflict. To date, the use of litigation science has been
fairly isolated, so perhaps leading journals will step up their review
practices as the subject gets more attention.275 Considering the dif-
ficulty the publishing community has had in adopting any
consistency among peer review and publication practices gener-
ally,276 however, it is doubtful the courts can expect immediate help
with litigation science from journal publishers.
Initiating post-litigation peer revieur If the litigation basis of a study
has in fact been properly disclosed, and the study has been peer
articles without disclosure of pharmaceutical company relationships and litigation relation-
ships, respectively. See supra Section II.B.2.
274. In light of the lack of a disclosure requirement by many journals, perhaps this
statement is too extreme. On the other hand, it is fairly safe to assume that proponents of
litigation research who do not want close scrutiny will seek out journals with no disclosure
requirement, precisely for the purpose of avoiding disclosure and the resulting scrutiny.
275. Unfortunately, to avoid the stigma associated with having an article rejected for
publication litigation research tends to be submitted not to leading journals but to lesser
publications, where peer review may not exist and publication is less difficult. See, e.g., Val-
entine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co., 921 E Supp. 666, 670 n.3 (D. Nev. 1996) (publication in
journal not listed in Index Medicus or found atJohns Hopkins library).
276. See supra Part II.B.2.
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reviewed by a respectable journal and published with disclosures,
the process does not end there. To support litigation, the study (or
the experts interpreting it) may claim fairly dramatic
consequences-the identification of a new human teratogen (e.g.,
Bendectin) or a widespread source of serious human injury (e.g.,
breast implants). The scientific world would never accept a single
study on such a topic as anything more than potential evidence of
a connection that needs further and more extensive study on
numerous fronts before the falsification process is reasonably
satisfied. The courts, however, may be forced to make causation
decisions on just such a single study. 7 As the system currently
operates, major public health decisions with consequences for
millions of people and the survival of major companies or
important products can turn on such an inadequate scientific
basis.
The scientific community could help the courts tremendously by
getting out in front of the legal process on exploding public health
issues. When a litigation public health issue first arises, either
through a litigation-funded study or otherwise, ideally the entities
that fund and direct scientific research should determine, through
independent scientists, whether the issue merits study and then
fund and direct those studies as soon as possible. This is precisely
the process followed in the Ruffin case, in which plaintiffs' carpet
testing attracted the attention of Congress, the EPA, and an inde-
pendent researcher. The expert's test was thereafter subjected to
(and refuted by) replicatory testing. In contrast, the breast im-
plant fiasco wandered through twelve years of litigation, multi-
million dollar settlements, and bankruptcies of defendants before
the scientific community got around to conducting the first inde-
pendent epidemiological study addressing the existence of a
connection between breast implants and connective disease. 9
277. Most of the cases discussed in Section I involved a single or small set of studies
purportedly supporting novel theories of injury. See, e.g., Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
89 E3d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1996) (alleged birth defects from fertility drug supported by sin-
gle published study authored by plaintiffs' expert); Valentine, 921 F. Supp. at 670 (chlorine
neurological damage theory supported by a single published study by plaintiffs' expert).
278. Ruffin v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 149 F.3d 294, 297-98 (4th Cir. 1998).
279. See Marcia Angell, Evaluating the Health Risks of Breast Implants: The Interplay of
Medical Science, the Law, and Public Opinion, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1513, 1515 (1996) (first
lawsuit in 1982; first epidemiological study completed in 1994). Dr. Angell believes the
breast implant manufacturers are to blame for not performing epidemiological studies long
before. Id. The manufacturers would have had little reason, however, to perform such
studies until the first lawsuits alleged what was until then a non-existent connection to
disease, or for that matter until the lawsuits escalated to the point funding expensive studies
would make sense, either medically or economically. Post-litigation research by the
defendants would have to undergo scrutiny (and be criticized) as litigation-generated
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Twelve years is far too long for the legal world, where the courts
are confronted with the alleged victims of potentially harmful
products and the pressure to provide near immediate relief is se-
vere.
Granted, research dollars are always in short supply, and some in
the scientific community will no doubt feel that their scarce re-
sources should not be diverted to support the ugly world of lawyers
battling over millions of dollars. No one can argue, however, that
some of the largest public health issues of the century have been
decided in, or substantially impacted by, the litigation arena, not
the laboratory. If there is potential merit to some of the conten-
tions made by plaintiff groups, the scientific community ought to
investigate. If there is not, scientists ought to intervene as well to
prevent biased and wholly inadequate science from driving the na-
tion's public health decisions and consuming its resources.
The biggest hurdle to timely scientific review of breaking litiga-
tion theories is the lack of any mechanism to trigger early review.
The publication of early litigation research, if it is published at all,
will likely occur in minor journals and in quiet ways that will not
attract serious scientific attention-"publish and be ignored,"
rather than "publish and be damned." Interest in the novel theo-
ries will not arise until lawsuits are filed and won in large numbers,
and by then the allegations have taken on a life of their own that
even good science may not stop. 2s° By the time scientific interest
develops, manufacturers may have been forced into bankruptcy
even though plaintiffs' evidence later turns out to be scientifically
worthless. No institution currently has a mandate to monitor litiga-
tion science, and the attention and conclusions of entities such as
the EPA or FDA will be sporadic and often equivocal. Section IV.C
addresses this problem with a proposal for an external review
mechanism.
2. Legal Review of Litigation Science-Whether or not scientists
properly address litigation science, courts must do so because they
research funded by the defendant company. In fact, plaintiffs' attorneys in the breast
implant cases immediately criticized even the Mayo Clinic study in 1994 because it was
partially funded by a foundation that received money from breast implant makers. See
ANGELL, supra note 59 at 142-43. More preferable would be independent research or
literature reviews, as in the Ruffin case, supra note 278.
280. The Bendectin cases have been going on since at least 1977, despite the absence
of any study confirming that the drug causes birth defects in humans and the presence of
multiple epidemiological studies supporting the lack of any connection. See FOSTER &
HUBER, supra note 60, at 2-4. Merrill-Dow has won almost all of the lawsuits, yet they con-
tinue to be filed. Id. Despite its success in litigating the cases, Merrell-Dow was forced to
take the product off the market in 1983 because of the extraordinary costs of litigating these
baseless claims. Id.
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are certain to be confronted with it. Court review of litigation stud-
ies follows the same paths as scientific review, but may be
complicated because courts are not well equipped to identify the
flaws in such research.
Initial identification: Initially, the court (and opposing parties)
will have to question the source of a relatively recent study offered
in support of a proponent's case. The proponent may not reveal
that the study was performed with a litigation connection. If the
opposing lawyers are doing their job properly, they will have con-
ducted discovery and can provide the court with relevant funding
information and the details of litigation's influence on the study.81
If not, the court must ensure that biased science is not introduced
in disguise.
Reliance on the scientific process- If the study has a litigation genesis,
the court should inquire into the level of review of the study and
its proposed theory by the scientific community. In the same way
that the publishing community should conduct a heightened re-
view, the court must not accept the fact of publication as sufficient
to ensure the integrity of the study. The court's ability to rely on
the scientific falsification process depends upon the degree to
which that process has actually occurred and achieved some meas-
ure of scientific acceptance of the approach or methodology used.
If the article in question does not meet certain benchmarks, the
court should give it little or no consideration in deciding whether
the expert's testimony should be excluded. Benchmarks that leave
an article short of even the most basic reliability should include:
The authors did not disclose the litigation connection to the
journal.
The journal did not disclose the litigation connection to its
peer reviewers.
The journal did not use external peer reviewers who are ex-
perts in the field.
The peer review process does not have other sufficient ear-
marks of a serious and quality review.
281. See Lust, 89 F.3d at 596 (expert admitted litigation connection of prior study on
cross-examination). In the Bourne matter, supra note 21, the law firm funding and other
litigation connections of two published in vitro studies relied on by plaintiffs' expert was not
known until counsel deposed the lead researcher (not an expert in the case) in England.
See Dep. of W.G. McLean, supra notes 22, 23, 26.
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The journal failed to publish the article with disclosure of its
litigation connection, thus preventing other scientists from
conducting appropriate post-publication peer review.
Beyond these basic "first blush" tests, the court should inquire
into the degree to which the scientific community has attempted to
falsify the methodology or results reported in the study. Through
reviews, letters to the editor, subsequent research, and the like, other
scientists may have already identified flaws in the work and can pro-
vide the court a roadmap. If the article has received little or no
attention, however, the court will find no help there and must use its
own attempts to judge the expert's methodology. In addition, stand-
ing alone, some means of addressing new methodologies cannot
properly be called peer review. Courts should give little or no weight
to abstracts and case reports,2  poster presentations at confer-
283 284
ences, anecdotal evidence or personal experience, or legislative
testimony.2 85 Courts should also reject arguments that cross-
examination of the challenged expert or a contrary opinion by an
opposing testifying expert during the case can substitute for peer
review in a Daubert analysis.
286
Apart from direct review of the research itself, the consistency or
inconsistency of the article's conclusions with related scientific
282. See, e.g., Nelson v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 92 E Supp. 2d 954, 969 (W.D. Mo.
2000) (noting that case reports do not attempt to investigate alternative causes and that at
most they "relay a basis for scientific hypotheses" rather than a "a causal link sufficient for
admission to a finder of fact"); Bushore v. Dow Corning-Wright Corp., No. 92-344-Civ-T-26C,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20697, *15-16 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 1999) (remarking that "anecdotal
or clinical data may be appropriate for treatment... [but] such methodology is not gener-
ally accepted in the scientific community as sufficiently reliable to determine causation");
Cartwright v. Home Depot, 936 F. Supp. 900, 903 n.6 (M.D. Fla. 1996) ("[C]ase reports are
no substitute for scientific study."); Jones v. United States, 933 F. Supp. 894, 899 n.8 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) (abstracts insufficient); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 E Supp. 1387, 1405-
06 (D. Or. 1996) (abstracts insufficient); Casey v. Ohio Med. Prods., 877 F. Supp. 1380, 1385
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (explaining reasons why case reports fail as scientific evidence of causa-
tion). One court has found case reports sufficiently reliable but then only if combined with
other causation evidence such as published articles, regulatory findings and animal studies.
See Eve v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., No. IP 98-1429-C-Y/s, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4531, *60-74
(S.D. Ind. March 7, 2001)
283. See Minn. Mining & Mfg. v. Atterbury, 978 S.W.2d 183, 200-01 (Tex. Ct. App.
1998).
284. In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 E Supp. 2d 1217, 1234-36 (D. Colo. 1998); FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 344 n.25 (1994).
285. At least one court has given credence to legislative testimony as supporting admis-
sibility under Daubert. See Hall v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 69 F Supp. 2d 716, 725 (W.D. Pa.
1999). Legislative cross-examination at the hands of politically minded members of Con-
gress, however, hardly qualifies as the kind of scientific review and inquiry needed to assess
the reliability of litigation research.
286. See cases cited supra notes 222-23.
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knowledge should be an indication as to whether the test was con-
ducted within the realm of acceptable scientific methodologies or
is on the periphery. If the research is not consistent with other ex-
isting science that supports the same conclusion, demonstrates its
plausibility, or otherwise offers external indicia of the litigation
science's validity, the article may pose too great a risk of bad sci-
ence to justify its use in court or to support an expert's
admissibility under Daubert.28
7
Alternatives to traditional peer review: The court may be able to find
indicia of trustworthiness outside the normal processes of peer re-
view. For instance, under the right circumstances, regulatory or
agency review may suffice as a form of study validation. 28 As noted
above, agency review is ordinarily substantially more demanding
than publication peer review. In addition, studies conducted pur-
suant to Good Laboratory Practices (GLP), as often required by
agencies for data submission, offer evidence that the study was rig-
orously conducted. At least one court has questioned the reliability
of testing that did not comport with GLP. 2 9 In addition to GLP and
regulatory review, courts have also recognized that detailed presen-
tations to qualified participants at societal meetings or conferences
may satisfy Daubert's peer review requirement.2 90 Governmental
studies or commissions appointed by the government may also
constitute "peer review" even if they do not occur in the typical
peer review publication sense.291
Independent validation of the research: Because of the peculiar risks
of manipulation posed by litigation science, courts may need to
require that the proponents of a theory have obtained some form
287. See Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[Expert]
admitted that no peer-reviewed article [supported expert's conclusion] that Clomid is a
human teratogen."); Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F Supp. 1490, 1520
(E.D. Ark. 1996) (expert's hypothesis "has not to date been legitimized by further research
and studies"); cf Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 43 E3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Daubert I) (noting that despite years of litigation, no scientist not involved in the litigation
found plaintiffs' studies worthy of comment or support).
288. See United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1155 (9th Cir. 1994). Likewise, agency
positions contrary to those espoused by a litigation study are evidence supporting rejection
under Daubert. See Ruffin v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 149 F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir. 1998); Daubert II,
43 F3d at 1314.
289. See Metabolife Int'l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 E3d 832, 859 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding
that Chinese tests were not reliable because protocols were "not developed through scien-
tific consensus" and the tests were not subject to government oversight or good laboratory
practice).
290. See Frank v. New York, 972 E Supp. 130, 135 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
291. See, e.g., Pozefsky v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. 92-CV-0314, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11813, at *9-12 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2001) (relying on court ordered panels and do-
mestic and international government commissioned panels who studied the association
between breast implant use and systematic illness).
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of independent review and validation of the entire study, not
merely the published article. If the circumstances under which the
study was performed raise a risk of manipulation and indicate a
lack of adequate procedures, an open and independent review by
••• 292
an unbiased source, obtained by the litigant, may be necessary to
guarantee that the research is scientifically based and not outcome-
driven.
Reliability inquiry by the court It is unlikely that the court will find
enough information available in the scientific community on a
newly-conducted litigation study to resolve an admissibility inquiry.
In most instances, even if the article passes the first blush test
above, the court will need to proceed to a serious inquiry into the
manner in which the study was conducted; the role of the lawyers
in the work; the completeness and accuracy of reporting of the test
data; the propriety of the protocol and hypothesis (including
whether the researchers predetermined the outcome and set out
to prove it); and all the other factors that place litigation research
at risk of generating biased science.
At this point, the discovery conducted by the parties becomes
critical, and counsel would be well advised to conduct the discov-
ery appropriately. The discovery effort is likely to include
depositions of the principal researchers, who may not be identified
293as testifying experts, and possibly of the journal editors if the
study is published 4
Assessing the 'fit": Apart from the reliability of the study, the court
should also inquire into whether the research itself is sufficiently
related to the theory espoused by the litigants to merit submission
292. The funding of such an inquiry, is, of course, the Achilles' Heel to this proposal
because the unbiased nature of the independent review could at least potentially be com-
promised by one side's funding of the work. We refer the reader to the alternative proposed
in Section W.C.
293. Discovery of the non-testifying researcher should focus not only on the details of
the study but also on the litigation connection of the study, including the researcher's rela-
tionship with the testifying expert, meetings involving the testifying expert or lawyers, the
litigation purpose of the study, the testifying expert's control over the study and protocol,
and funding sources for the researcher's work.
294. Discovery of the journal should be directed towards the editor most knowledge-
able about the peer review and publication of the article in question. The discovery should
focus on the journal's disclosure and peer review practices, including whether the journal
adheres to the Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Standards, see UNi-
FORM REQUIREMENTS, supra note 139; the disclosure of the litigation connection and
funding sources of the research; the nature and extent of the journal's peer review of the
article in question, including use of external reviewers; and the peer reviewers' comments
and changes made to the article. The peer reviewers themselves will be difficult to depose
because of the confidentiality that surrounds the peer review system and the need to protect
journals and their peer reviewers from litigation intrusion into that confidentiality.
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to the jury. This is the Daubert "fit" requirement,2Y5 which may be
dispositive if the study, despite its publication and general accep-
tance, actually has little relevance to the theory or use of the theory
proffered by the testifying expert. Experts with weak theories may
only submit a portion of their opinion or methodology (i.e., selected
study results) to peer review, but refrain, for fear of rejection, from
submitting their entire theory and its underpinnings (e.g., the ex-
trapolation of causation from the study results).2 6 In such cases, the
expert's ultimate opinion/methodology has not been subjected to
peer review and may not "fit" with the litigation science upon
which the expert relies, and thus may not meet the requirements
of Daubert.
Court-appointed expert review. As commentators have frequently
noted, the court system is ill equipped to make complex scientific
determinations.297 Nonetheless, in the realm of litigation science,
the judge may have to fill the role of peer reviewer of the litigation
science. To cross over into its own scientific inquiry, however, the
court must ask the same kinds of questions a peer reviewer would
ask. Is it a good study? Does the data support the conclusions? Are
there holes or flaws in the reasoning? Was the design appropriate
for the hypothesis presented?
In some instances, judges should be capable of answering the
queries regarding whether the methodology is properly peer re-
viewed and generally accepted. In the instances in which the
science is sufficiently complicated or the merits of a study are too
uncertain, however, this type of inquiry seems tailor-made for a
court-appointed expert. Under either Rule 706 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence 29 or a court's inherent powers under Rule
295. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591-93 (1993).
296. See, e.g., Black v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 592, 600 (S.D. W. Va. 1998)
(noting that presentation at symposia was "quite sketchy" and not accurate depiction of
actual study).
297. See Marcia Angell, Evaluating the Health Risks of Breast Implants: The Interplay of Medi-
cal Science, the Law, and Public Opinion, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1513, 1513 (1996) (discussing
courts' comfort with using methods to decide scientific issues "that can only be described as
antiscientific and irrational"); Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A
New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 "Ix. L. REv. 715, 716-17 (1994); Edward V. Di Lello,
Note, Fighting Fire with Firefighters: A Proposal for Expert Judges at the Trial Level, 93 COLUM. L.
REv. 473, 474-90 (1993) (addressing inadequacies of current system to address technical
science questions). The Daubert Court, on the other hand, stated rather facilely that "we are
confident that federal judges possess the capacity to undertake this review." Daubert, 509
U.S. at 593. Trial judges faced with complex scientific studies and allegations may find little
comfort in the Court's confidence.
298. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL 926, Order No. 31
(N.D. Ala. May 30, 1996).
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104(a) of the Federal Rules , federal courts can appoint an inde-
pendent expert or panel of experts to advise the court or even
testify as to complex scientific matters.3 0 0 This power has been used
sparingly,3 1 probably in part because of the feared complexity of
such a process or the lack of established rules for its use, thus cre-
ating a risk of appellate reversal. To be sure, the Rule 706 process
has its difficulties, a subject beyond the scope of this Article.3 2
Nevertheless, an expert with the narrow mandate of determin-
ing whether a study was acceptably performed and supportive of
the conclusions reached may be particularly appropriate to assess
the validity of science developed by courtroom advocates. Inde-
pendent review, for instance, of all study raw data and background
materials, accompanied by a report to the court, may help the
299. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996).
300. See Smith, supra note 185, at 66-69 (highlighting cases using court-appointed ex-
perts). The Daubert court in fact suggested just such a possibility. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
Justice Breyer expanded on this in General Electric Co. v. Joiner with a full-blown plea for
courts to begin utilizing Rule 706 in greater fashion. 522 U.S. 136, 149-50 (1997) (BreyerJ.,
concurring). Commentators have also issued calls for greater use of court-appointed ex-
perts. See Marc S. Klein et al., Empowering the Gatekeeper in the Post-Daubert Regime: Court-
Appointed Experts and Special Masters, in EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 67 at 436; Joe S. Cecil
& Thomas E. Willging, AcceptingDauberts Invitation: Defining a Role for Court-Appointed Experts
in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995 (1994); Lawrence S. Pinsky, Comment, The
Use of Scientific Peer Review and Colloquia to Assist Judges in the Admissibility Gatekeeping Mandated
by Daubert, 34 Hous. L. REv. 527 (1997) (examining several alternatives for using peer re-
viewers to assist courts in a Daubert analysis); Note, Improving Judicial Gatekeeping: Technical
Advisors and Scientific Evidence, 110 HARV. L. REV. 941 (1997).
Selection of an appropriate expert may soon become easier through efforts of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science, which has launched a five-year pro-
ject to supplyjudges with experts available to advise courts on specific complicated subjects.
See Jocelyn Kaiser, Project Offers Judges Neutral Science Advice, 284 SCIENCE 1600 (1999). The
National Institutes of Health already maintains a list of potential scientific reviewers who
have been checked for conflicts of interest. SeeJames T. Rosenbaum, Lessons from Litigation
over Silicone Breast Implants: A Callfor Activism by Scientists, 276 SCIENCE 1524, 1525 (1997).
301. See Samuel H. Jackson, Technical Advisors Deserve Equal Billing with Court Appointed
Experts in Novel and Complex Scientific Cases: Does the FederalJudicial Center Agree', 28 ENVTL. L.
431, 444 (1998).
302. The most extensive use of a Rule 706 panel to date occurred in the breast implant
litigation before Judge Samuel Pointer in Alabama. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods.
Liab. Litig., MDL 926, Order No. 31 (N.D. Ala. May 30, 1996). That panel reviewed existing
literature on the alleged connection between breast implants and connective tissue diseases.
The panel encountered considerable difficulty created by the litigation process, and several
of its members have recommended changes for future panels. See Barbara S. Hulka et al.,
Experience of a Scientific Panel Formed to Advise the Federal Judiciary on Silicone Breast Implants,
342 NEW ENG.J. MED. 812 (2000). Nonetheless, the panel members encouraged greater use
of such panels to "bring unbiased information about complex scientific and medical issues
into the courtroom." Id. at 815. The suggestion here is that a modest version of a Rule 706
panel (perhaps even one expert) could usefully review complex litigation science and pro-
vide the court with a view on the scientific worthiness of that particular study, for the sole
purpose of independently verifying the study's design, performance, and conclusions and
ultimately the admissibility of the expert's testimony.
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court determine whether the study was properly conducted, re-
corded, and reported. The narrow focus of the independent
expert's review should alleviate some of the difficulties of using
similar experts for the ultimate issues to be resolved in the case
(such as causation).sos This is particularly true since the Rule 706
expert would not offer opinions that go to the fact finder's role,
but instead to the judicial role of determining admissibility of ex-
pert testimony. Further, the difficulties of locating such an expert
may be alleviated in the near future by the efforts of groups that
are creating lists of acceptable independent court experts in vari-
ous fields.' °4
C. The Need for an External, Institutionalized Review Process
The risks and problems attendant with litigation science
heighten the need for an external review process that judges can
readily tap for advice and input. Because litigation science is not
going away, the trick is to ensure that the studies are properly con-
ducted and interpreted to avoid error from litigation bias. More
idealistically, it is at least conceivable that litigation-funded re-
search could offer a positive contribution to public health issues if
it isjudged reliable by independent scientific review.
The solution would appear to be the creation of an independ-
ent body of experts whose role will encompass consideration of
litigation-based studies and verification of their validity and the
author's conclusions. If such a process were readily available, and
were integrated into the court process, judges could prevent the
303. A good example of a narrow use of a court-appointed expert is found in Renaud v.
Martin Marietta Corp., in which the court relied on an independent expert to assess the ac-
ceptability within the scientific community of the methodology used by one of the testifying
experts. 749 F. Supp. 1545, 1552-53 (D. Colo. 1990), affd, 972 F.2d 304 (10th Cir. 1992). We
do not take lightly the likelihood that the litigation itself may well rise or fall with the admis-
sibility of the litigation science, which may be the only link to causation. Even so, asking an
independent expert to review and comment on the reliability of one study or a handful of
studies is far less complicated and onerous than asking for an opinion on causation from all
available evidence, as required of the breast implant panel in the Alabama case.
304. Chief among these are Duke University School of Law's Private Adjudication
Center, which is developing a registry of independent experts, see About the Registry, in
THE REGISTRY OF INDEPENDENT SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ADVISORS, at http://
www.law.duke.edu/pac/registry/about.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2001); Pinsky, supra note
300, at 545; the American Association for the Advancement of Science, which has launched
a five-year project to supply judges with experts available to advise courts on specific com-
plicated subjects, see Kaiser, supra note 300; and the National Institutes of Health, which
already maintains a list of potential scientific reviewers who have already been checked for
conflicts of interest, see Rosenbaum, supra note 300, at 1525.
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introduction of unreliable science without engaging in their own
version of inexpert peer review. In fact, the growing use of science
in court generally has already prompted a chorus of voices calling
for institutionalized and increased usage of independent experts. °5
A few such institutions already exist. For instance, Duke University
School of Law's Private Adjudication Center is compiling a "Regis-
try" of independent medical and health experts and has
established guidelines to address payments to the experts, con-
flicts, and interaction with courts.00 In general, however, the use of
independent experts in any form by courts is still limited and does
307not show significant signs of increasing.
The peculiar risks and growing use of litigation science only
heighten the need for an external body and institutionalized proc-
ess to assist courts. To address this concern, it may be necessary to
create an independent body, called perhaps the "Institute for Liti-
gation Research" (ILR). The ILR would function as a non-profit
group to be comprised of a board of independent legal and scien-
tific trustees, an administrative staff, and a body of essentially
conflict-free experts. Initially, proponents of litigation science who
seek to use such science in court would have the opportunity to
submit their research, along with all supporting documentation, to
a relevant panel of ILR experts. In this role, the ILR would not
only review the basic methodology and conformity with the scien-
tific method of the study, similar to a quality publication peer
review process, but the ILR would also assess the test data and per-
formance of the study in a manner designed to ensure the integrity
of the underlying work. The panel could also ensure that the re-
search is not "overinterpreted" to prove more than it actually
supports. The ILR would thus provide the independent verifica-
tion of the research's reliability and fit so necessary to legitimize
this type of work. An imprimatur of approval from the ILR panel
would undoubtedly play a significant role in a Daubert hearing.
Courts could make the use of the ILR more of an imperative by
requiring submission of litigation studies to the ILR before they
305. See, e.g., Black et al., supra note 297; E. Donald Elliott, Toward Incentive-Based Proce-
dure: Three Approaches for Regulating Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REv. 487, 507-11 (1989);
Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1113, 1213 (1991).
306. See Pinsky, supra note 300, at 545.
307. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 21.5 (1985); JACK B.
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE §706.02[1] (Joseph M.
McLaughlin ed., 1997); Cecil & Willging, supra note 300, at 1004 (noting that although
"[m]any commentators have mentioned that the use of court-appointed experts appears to
be rare," twenty percent of federal judges responding to a survey reported having ap-
pointed an expert at least once).
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are used in court. Currently, the authority for such a requirement
could fall under either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 706 (the
court would simply appoint the ILR as its Rule 706 expert), or
perhaps the court could make submission a requirement for
Daubert admissibility under Federal Rules of Evidence 104 and 702.
Far better would be an amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to institutionalize the use of outside scientific review,
but that development would probably have to await a certain
amount of positive experience with the ILR or a similar body such
as Duke's Registry.3'
An ILR panel could also fulfill a broader role by taking on the
review of existing (i.e., non-litigation) research in addition to liti-
gation studies to assess the impact of the litigation research in the
context of the full literature. This type of panel begins to approach
the role of a full-scale Rule 706 panel, similar to the breast implant
panel appointed by Judge Pointer in Alabama. At an even more
aggressive level, the ILR could conceivably design and conduct its
own research on an issue raised by significant litigation. Ifjustified,
such an effort could either identify, through compelling science,
an important public health risk, or short circuit the wasteful and
highly damaging process experienced in the breast implant
309
cases.
Perhaps the experiments initiated by Duke and others will grow
into something approaching the ILR concept described above. In
any event, the growing use of litigation-funded and driven research
should help invigorate the discussion around science in the court-
room and perhaps give these proposals some urgency. The
experience of courts over the next decade in dealing with litiga-
tion science will likely crystalize that discussion and potentially
lead to some sort of institutionalized review mechanism, whether
an ILR is part of that mechanism or not.
308. Other commentators have made similar proposals. See, e.g., Black et al., supra note
297, at 786 n.454 (reviewing proposals); Cecil & Willging, supra note 300, at 1057, 1063
(recommending change to pre-trial procedure); Jackson, supra note 301, at 456-60 (review-
ing alternative proposals).
309. Numerous issues would have to be resolved to make an ILR-type institution work.
Funding is a major concern, but a "user pays" system could potentially be funded by indus-
tries heavily involved in defending against toxic tort and product litigations, and by a fee
assessed against plaintiff verdicts in excess of a certain amount, a co-funding arrangement
that would obviate allegations of funding bias. Overuse of such a valuable resource would
also be a concern, particularly if cases were filed on nothing but speculation in hopes the
ILR would discover the science to support the case. Courts and/or the ILR itself could pre-
vent misuse by requiring a prima facie showing sufficient to justify expenditure of resources
and/or partial funding of ILR expenditures. A shared funding arrangement in which the
party submitting research would significantly fund the ILR work might also minimize waste-
ful, speculative uses of the ILR process.
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CONCLUSION
Litigation science may someday prove to be a boon to science
and the law if it provides a source of funding for studies of impor-
tant public health issues that otherwise would not be available.
Such studies could help solve thorny legal causation issues, which
independent scientists have not yet addressed. Neither the scien-
tific world nor the legal world, however, will begin to trust
litigation science until both communities take steps to ensure the
legitimacy and integrity of such research. In the interim, in light of
the likely increased usage of litigation science, it is time for scien-
tists and courts alike to take account of the peculiar risks of
litigation science and account for those risks in their respective
truth-finding processes.
